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AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT: THE NEED FOR A REVISED BAILOUT SYSTEM 
CHRISTOPHER B. SEAMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
  In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder 
(“NAMUDNO”), 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009), the Supreme Court declined to 
decide one of the 2008 Term’s most prominent issues: the constitutionality of 
the 2006 renewal of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.  Instead, the Court 
adopted an unexpected statutory construction permitting the plaintiff to seek 
an exemption called “bailout” from continued coverage under this provision.  
Even though the Court avoided directly ruling on its constitutionality, 
NAMUDNO left little doubt that Section 5 remains on uncertain constitutional 
ground. 
  A revised bailout system is likely the best approach for placing Section 5 
on a more solid footing.  To date, however, bailout has been little used; despite 
predictions made during the previous renewal of Section 5 in 1982, only a 
handful of the thousands of covered jurisdictions have sought and successfully 
obtained bailout.  This article suggests that Congress should consider two 
major changes to the existing bailout system.  First, Congress should 
implement an “automatic” bailout that would unilaterally remove from 
coverage all jurisdictions that have not violated the major provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act since the 1982 renewal.  Second, the current requirements 
for obtaining bailout—which this Article calls “optional” bailout—should be 
revised to make it easier for jurisdictions to determine whether they are 
eligible.  Adopting these changes will more narrowly tailor Section 5 to apply 
to jurisdictions with a recent history of discrimination in voting and thus make 
it more likely to survive constitutional scrutiny the next time the issue is before 
the Court. 
  
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law.  J.D., University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, 2004; B.A., Swarthmore College, 2000.  I thank Gerry Hebert, Peyton McCrary, 
Carolyn Shapiro, and Rick Valelly, as well as the other participants of the Voting 45 Years After 
the Voting Rights Act Symposium, for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder 
(“NAMUDNO”),1 the Supreme Court declined to decide one of the 2008 
Term’s most prominent issues: the constitutionality of the 2006 renewal of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (“the Act”).2  Instead, the Court adopted an 
unexpected statutory construction permitting the plaintiff—an obscure utility 
district in suburban Austin, Texas—to seek an exemption called bailout from 
continued coverage under Section 5.3  But the majority opinion in NAMUDNO, 
by eight members of the Court, left little doubt that the renewed Section 5 
remains on uncertain ground, concluding it raised “serious constitutional 
questions” about the exercise of Congress’s enforcement power under the 
Fifteenth Amendment.4  In particular, the Court criticized Section 5’s 
geographically-targeted coverage formula—which encompasses mostly 
Southern jurisdictions with a lengthy history of de jure discrimination against 
minority voters—as unreflective of current political realities.5 
A revised bailout system is likely the best approach for placing Section 5 
on a more solid constitutional footing.  To date, bailout has been little used; 
despite predictions made during the previous renewal of Section 5 in 1982, 
only a handful of the thousands of covered jurisdictions have sought and 
successfully obtained bailout.  The rarity of bailout is attributable to several 
factors, including lack of awareness, the perceived complexity of the current 
bailout requirements, and the perception that bailout is expensive to pursue. 
Part I of this article describes the requirements of Section 5, including its 
coverage formula and bailout provisions, from enactment in 1965 through 
2006.  Part II analyzes the effectiveness of the current bailout standard and 
concludes that it has been largely unsuccessful at removing jurisdictions 
without a recent history of discrimination from coverage under Section 5 for 
several reasons.  Part III recounts the 2006 renewal of Section 5 in the Voting 
Rights Act Reauthorization Act (“VRARA”),6 with a focus on Congress’s 
decision to leave the coverage formula and bailout provisions intact, despite 
 
 1. 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006). 
 3. Relevant case law and scholarly articles tend to use different spelling of the word 
bailout, depending on its context.  Typically, “bailout” is the noun form, “bail out” is the verb 
form, and variations—such as “bailed out jurisdictions”—are spelled as two words. 
 4. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2513; see also id. at 2516 (“More than 
40 years ago, this Court concluded that ‘exceptional conditions’ prevailing in certain parts of the 
county justified [Section 5] . . . .  In part due to the success of that legislation, we are now a very 
different Nation.  Whether conditions continue to justify such legislation is a difficult 
constitutional question that we do not answer today.”). 
 5. Id. at 2511–12. 
 6. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577. 
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testimony from voting rights scholars and others warning about the potential 
constitutional problem this presented under the “congruence and 
proportionality” test for Congress’s enforcement power under the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 
Part IV critically examines the NAMUDNO litigation, including the three-
judge district court decision concluding that VRARA was constitutional and 
the Supreme Court’s unexpected statutory construction decision that—at least 
temporarily—avoided a final ruling on Section 5’s constitutionality.  In 
particular, it argues that the NAMUDNO Court gave Congress an opportunity 
to revise the scope of Section 5’s coverage to forestall a future successful 
challenge to its constitutionality. 
Finally, Part V recommends several changes to the Act’s bailout system to 
create a more narrowly targeted Section 5 that is more likely be found 
constitutional.  First, it proposes an “automatic” bailout—a unilateral removal 
from coverage—of all jurisdictions that have not received a Section 5 objection 
or been denied preclearance since the previous renewal of Section 5 in 1982 
and that have not lost or settled any voting rights litigation under Sections 27 or 
203 of the Act during that time.8  Second, it suggests that Congress revise the 
current bailout system—which this article calls “optional” bailout—to make it 
easier to determine whether a jurisdiction is eligible.  Specifically, it 
recommends that a covered jurisdiction should be allowed to bail out if it can 
establish (1) it has not violated Sections 2, 5, or 203 within the previous twenty 
years and (2) minority citizens in the covered jurisdiction have participated in 
the electoral process at rates substantially similar to non-Hispanic white voters.  
Third, Part V proposes that Congress require the Justice Department to identify 
and proactively notify jurisdictions that become eligible for optional bailout on 
a biannual basis.  Finally, covered jurisdictions should be permitted to recover 
reasonable attorney’s fees if they successfully obtain bailout in court over the 
Justice Department’s opposition. 
I.  PRECLEARANCE, COVERAGE, AND BAILOUT UNDER THE  
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–2006 
A. The 1965 Voting Rights Act 
The Voting Rights Act9 is widely regarded as one of the most successful 
pieces of civil rights legislation.10  Enacted in 1965 in the wake of the “Bloody 
 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
 8. Id. § 1973aa–1a.  Section 203 is one of the language minority provisions of the Act. 
 9. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 10. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 117 (2006) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) 
(calling the Voting Rights Act “one of the most important pieces of civil rights legislation ever 
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Sunday” march in Selma, Alabama, where state and local police violently 
attacked hundreds of civil rights activists protesting the disenfranchisement of 
black voters,11 the Voting Rights Act was intended to “banish the blight of 
racial discrimination in voting, which ha[d] infected the electoral process in 
parts of our country for nearly a century.”12 
From Reconstruction through the mid-twentieth century, white Southerners 
devised and implemented numerous barriers—polls taxes, literary tests and 
other devices, and threats and the reality of outright violence—to prevent 
blacks from registering and voting.13  Starting in the late 1950s, civil rights 
advocates and the Justice Department began attacking these discriminatory 
tests and devices through case-by-case litigation.14  The Civil Rights Act of 
1957 created a Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice and vested it 
with the authority to bring constitutional challenges to barriers on minority 
voting.15  These efforts, however, were time-consuming, expensive, and 
 
enacted.”); Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 736 (2008) 
(“[T]he Voting Rights Act . . . [is] widely regarded as the most successful intervention for racial 
minorities during the last century . . . .”); Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared:  Congressional 
Power to Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (“The [Voting 
Rights] Act is rightly celebrated as the cornerstone of the ‘Second Reconstruction.’”). 
 11. At the time of “Bloody Sunday,” only 2.2% of black citizens in Dallas County, Alabama, 
where Selma is located, were registered to vote, despite repeated voter registration drives and 
efforts.  Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 104 (M.D. Ala. 1965); see also Chandler 
Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING:  
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7, 14–17 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds. 
1992) [hereinafter CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING].  For a more detailed explanation of 
the role of Selma (and Alabama generally) in the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, see 
generally BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, FREE AT LAST TO VOTE:  THE ALABAMA ORIGINS OF THE 1965 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2007); see also DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS:  MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 357–430 (1986); 
DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA:  MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE VOTING RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1965 (1978). 
 12. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
 13. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE:  MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND 
THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 22–38 (1999); RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE 
TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS:  THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT 121–48 (2004); J. 
Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES IN 
MINORITY VOTING, supra note 11, at 135, 140–45. 
 14. See LANDSBERG, supra note 11, at 6 (explaining that the Civil Rights Act of 1957 
“triggered an initially gradual, but later quickening, process of litigative action” against voting 
discrimination in the South).  Landsberg’s book discusses in detail three voting-rights cases 
brought by the Justice Department in Sumter County, Elmore County, and Perry County, 
Alabama, in the early 1960s.  Id. at 34–147. 
 15. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634; see also Armand Derfner, 
Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 545–47 (1973) (describing 
the 1957 Civil Rights Act); Warren M. Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1965) (same). 
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generally ineffectual.16  The cases were tried before southern federal district 
court judges, many of whom were reluctant to order local officials to register 
black voters.17  And even when a discriminatory test was eliminated through 
litigation, state legislators or local officials instead implemented “newer, more 
subtle ways of minimizing black voter registration,” rendering the relief 
obtained practically meaningless.18 
In response, civil rights groups sought a stronger voting rights law that 
would increase the Justice Department’s enforcement powers.  This came to 
fruition with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which directly involved the 
federal government in the mechanics of state and local elections.  The Act 
contained numerous provisions designed to break down the barriers that had 
prevented minorities from participating in the electoral process for nearly a 
century.  Section 4 automatically suspended the use of literacy tests and similar 
devices as a prerequisite to voting in covered jurisdictions.19  Sections 6 
through 8 permitted the Justice Department to assign federal examiners to 
register voters and federal observers to monitor the conduct of federal, state, 
 
 16. Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It:  Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 
HOW. L.J. 785, 791 (2006). 
 17. See, e.g., Richard M. Valelly, Bureaucratic Learning and Statutory Design:  The 
Governmental Origins of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 6 ELECTION L.J. 429, 429 (2007) (book 
review of LANDSBERG, supra note 11) (explaining that before the Voting Rights Act, “[t]oo many 
Southern federal judges, and certainly the vast majority of local elections officials in the Deep 
South, went through the motions of compliance while blocking the development of a new, bi-
racial electorate.”).  For example, in a lawsuit in Sumter County, Alabama, U.S. District Judge 
Hobart Grooms enjoined local registrars from imposing a “white witness requirement” on 
prospective black applicants.   However, he stopped short of actually ordering local officials to 
register the applicants who had been discriminated against, requiring only that these applicants be 
informed they could reapply.  LANDSBERG, supra note 11, at 70–71. 
 18. Peyton McCrary, Bringing Equality To Power: How The Federal Courts Transformed 
The Electoral Structure of Southern Politics, 1960–1990, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 685 (2003); 
see also Leading Cases, Need for Preclearance, 122 HARV. L. REV. 495, 495 (2008) (explaining 
the pattern of pre-1965 voting rights litigation was “well established:  The states would find some 
apparently nonracial test by which to disenfranchise blacks, the restriction would be challenged in 
court, the plaintiffs would occasionally win, and the states would always devise a new restriction 
just as effective as the last one.”). 
 19. Voting Rights Act of 1965, supra note 9, at § 4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1973b (2006)).  Section 4 defined a prohibited “test or device” as 
any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) 
demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate 
any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good 
moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or 
members of any other class. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (2006).  The suspension of prohibited tests and devices was made 
permanent in the Act’s 1975 revision and renewal.  Tokaji, supra note 16, at 792. 
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and local elections in certain locations.20  Section 10 found that the poll tax 
unlawfully had “the purpose or effect of denying persons the right to vote 
because of race or color” and directed the Attorney General to bring litigation 
against state and local governments that continued to use it.21  Section 2 
restated the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on practices that denied or 
abridged the right to vote on account of race,22 and Section 3 enhanced the 
Justice Department’s enforcement power through litigation.23 
In addition to these provisions, Congress sought an alternative to the “case-
by-case litigation” that had proven to be “an unsatisfactory method” to remedy 
“discriminatory election practices in certain areas.”24  “After enduring nearly a 
century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment,” Congress 
instead decided to “shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators 
of the evil to its victims.”25  The result was Section 5, which has become a key 
pillar of the Act. 
Described as one of the most “novel”26 and “inventive” remedies in federal 
law, Section 5 mandates federal scrutiny of all election laws implemented in 
certain jurisdictions.27  Specifically, it requires these jurisdictions obtain 
approval—called preclearance—whenever they “enact or seek to administer” a 
change to any “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting.”28  To 
receive preclearance, a jurisdiction must establish that the proposed change 
“neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color” or, since 1975, on account of 
membership in a “language minority group.”29  The jurisdiction bears the 
burden of persuasion on these issues.30  The proposed election change cannot 
be legally implemented until the jurisdiction receives preclearance.31 
 
 20. Voting Rights Act of 1965, supra note 9, at §§ 6–8 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973d–f 
(2006)).  For a more detailed discussion about the role of federal observers and examiners in 
voting rights enforcement, see James Thomas Tucker, The Power of Observation:  The Role of 
Federal Observers Under the Voting Rights Act, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 227 (2007). 
 21. Voting Rights Act of 1965, supra note 9, at § 10 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973h (2006)). 
 22. Id. § 2 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)). 
 23. Id. § 3 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (2006)). 
 24. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 243 (1984). 
 25. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). 
 26. McCrary, supra note 18, at 686. 
 27. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327; 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). 
 29. Id.; see id. at § 1973l(c)(3) (defining “language minority group” as “persons who are 
American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives or of Spanish heritage.”). 
 30. 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2009); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538 (1973).  Mark 
Posner, a former attorney in the Voting Section, has explained “Section 5 does not explicitly 
provide that covered jurisdictions have the burden of proof in section 5 preclearance lawsuits, but 
the Supreme Court has inferred such a burden from the statute.”  Mark A. Posner, Time Is Still on 
Its Side: Why Congressional Reauthorization of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Represents a 
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Preclearance can be obtained by submitting the proposed change to either 
the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia.32  In practice, almost all (>99.9%) proposed 
changes are submitted to the Attorney General for preclearance because it is 
faster and less expensive.33  Specifically, the Justice Department is required to 
make a preclearance determination within sixty days of receiving a 
submission,34 and this administrative process is more informal and less costly 
than a declaratory judgment lawsuit in the District Court.35  For example, in the 
Georgia v. Ashcroft36 Section 5 litigation, the state of Georgia was estimated to 
have spent over $1.4 million in attorney’s fees.37  If a jurisdiction does not 
 
Congruent and Proportional Response to Our Nation’s History of Discrimination in Voting, 10 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 62 n.44 (2006) (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 335). 
 31. Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652 (1991); Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656, 656 (1975) 
(per curiam); see also United States v. Bd. of Supervisors of Warren Cnty., Miss., 429 U.S. 642, 
645 (1977) (“No new voting practice or procedure may be enforced unless the State or political 
subdivision has succeeded in its declaratory judgment action or the Attorney General has declined 
to object to a proposal submitted to him.”). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a); see also McCrary, supra note 18, at 686 (explaining that under 
Section 5, “either a three-judge panel in the federal courts of the District of Columbia or the 
Attorney General of the United States must ‘preclear’ voting changes before they can be legally 
enforced.”).  By regulation, the responsibility and authority for preclearance decisions have been 
delegated by the Attorney General to the Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division.  
28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2009).  With the exception of objections and requests for reconsideration of 
objections, the Chief of the Voting Section may act on behalf of the Assistant Attorney General.  
Id. 
 33. From 1965 through mid-2004, jurisdictions submitted over 400,000 proposed voting 
changes to the Justice Department, while only 68 declaratory judgment actions were filed in the 
U.S. District Court—less than 0.02% of all proposed changes.  U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
VOTING RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT & REAUTHORIZATION: THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S 
RECORD OF ENFORCING THE TEMPORARY VOTING RIGHTS ACT PROVISIONS 67–69 (2006), 
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/051006VRAStatReport.pdf. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a); 28 C.F.R. § 51.9(a) (2009).  If the information initially provided 
by the covered jurisdiction is insufficient for the Justice Department to make a determination 
within the sixty-day period, it may request additional information about the proposed change and 
extend the determination period by an additional sixty days.  28 C.F.R. § 51.37(a), (c) (2009).  In 
addition, a covered jurisdiction may request expedited consideration of a change, although the 
Justice Department is under no obligation to do so.  Id. at § 51.34(a), (b). 
 35. See Voting Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., Making Section 5 
Submissions, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/making.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2010) 
(“The Section 5 administrative review process is designed to be an expeditious, cost-effective 
alternative to the Section 5 declaratory judgment process.”). 
 36. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
 37. Anthony A. Peacock, From Beer to Eternity:  Why Race Will Always Predominate 
Under the Voting Rights Act, in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 119, 145 (Peter F. 
Galderisi ed., 2005). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 17 
obtain preclearance from the Attorney General, the change cannot be legally 
implemented unless the jurisdiction obtains relief from the District Court.38 
The geographic reach of Section 5 is determined by the coverage formula 
contained in Section 4(b) of the Act.  This formula was originally designed in 
1965 as a “facially neutral tool for covering jurisdictions” with a “pervasive 
history of minority disenfranchisement.”39  A jurisdiction automatically fell 
within the original coverage formula if it satisfied two requirements: (1) the 
use of a “test or device” for determining eligibility to register or vote40 and (2) 
a rate of voter registration or turnout below 50% in the 1964 presidential 
election.41  Although denounced as “arbitrary” by its opponents at the time,42 
Section 4(b)’s coverage formula effectively captured most areas that had a 
history of widespread race discrimination in voting: the entire states of 
Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Virginia, as well as forty counties in North Carolina.43  It also included a 
handful of counties in Arizona, Hawaii, and Idaho.44  However, the formula 
also omitted several jurisdictions with a history of discrimination, including 
Texas and Arkansas.45  Nonetheless, most voting rights scholars agree the 
 
 38. See, e.g., Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 505 & n.21 (1977); Posner, supra note 30, at 
72.  However, there is no direct appeal of the Attorney General’s determination whether to grant 
or deny preclearance to the District Court under the Administrative Procedure Act.  See Morris, 
432 U.S. at 501 (“The nature of the § 5 remedy . . . strongly suggests that Congress did not intend 
the Attorney General’s actions under that provision to be subject to judicial review.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 39. Pamela S. Karlan, Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance Under the Voting 
Rights Act, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 1, 17 (June 14, 2006), http://www.acslaw.org/ 
node/2964. 
 40. For the definition of a “test or device” in Section 4, see supra note 19. 
 41. Voting Rights Act of 1965, supra note 9, at § 4(b).  The national turnout rate of the 
voting age population in the 1964 presidential election was 61.9%.  Michael P. McDonald & 
Samuel L. Popkin, The Myth of the Vanishing Voter, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 963, 966 (2001). 
 42. STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS:  VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969 at 
319 (1976).  In the House floor debate for the Act, a Georgia representative sarcastically 
remarked that the formula might as well have selected 
all states which have an average altitude of 100 to 900 feet, an average yearly temperature 
of 68° to 77° at 7 a.m., average humidity of 80 to 87%, and a coastline of 50 to 400 miles.  
With this formula, we encompass all the Southern states attacked by H.R. 6400, but have 
the added advantage of including all of North Carolina and excluding Alaska. 
Id. (quoting 89 Cong. Rec. 15,723 (July 7, 1965) (statement of Rep. Howard Calloway)). 
 43. Michael P. McDonald, Who’s Covered?  Coverage Formula and Bailout, in THE 
FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 255, 256 (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Karlan, supra note 10, at 26.  Some scholars have suggested that the omission of 
Texas and Arkansas from the original coverage formula was a strategic choice designed to 
“sidestep determined opposition by Texas’s and Arkansas’s powerful legislation.”  SAMUEL 
ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 470 (3d. ed. 2007). 
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original coverage formula “did a reasonably good job of picking up most, if 
not all, of the places with a history of pervasive violations of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments.”46 
Recognizing that the coverage formula might be overinclusive in some 
situations, Section 4 also included a bailout provision permitting jurisdictions 
to request termination of coverage.47  This provision “was aimed at correcting 
any instances of a ‘false positive’—i.e., any instances where the coverage 
formula wrongly identified a particular jurisdiction as having engaged in 
pervasive violation of the right to vote.”48  As the House Judiciary Committee 
explained: 
[T]here may be areas covered under the formula of section 4 where there has 
been no racial discrimination violating the 15th Amendment. The bill takes 
account of this possibility by a provision which affords any State or 
subdivision an opportunity to exempt itself, by obtaining an adjudication that 
such tests or devices have not been used by it to accomplish substantial 
discrimination in the preceding 5 years . . . . This provision for overturning the 
presumption or inference created by the determinations in section 4 provides 
assurance that no State or subdivision will be treated unfairly and that the 
suppression of tests and devices will be applied only to areas where it is 
necessary to enforce the rights guaranteed under the 15th amendment.49 
Thus, even from the Act’s inception, bailout was designed as a “safety valve” 
to release from coverage jurisdictions that could establish they had not 
discriminated against minority voters.50 
To obtain bailout, the jurisdiction had to establish that during the preceding 
five years, no “test or device” had been used “for the purpose or with the effect 
 
 46. Karlan, supra note 10, at 26; see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 14 (1965), reprinted in 
1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2445 (“Decisions of the Federal courts and the reports of the U.S. Civil 
Rights Commission persuasively indicate that many of the States and political subdivisions to 
which the formula applies have engaged in widespread violations of the [Fifteenth] [A]mendment 
over a period of time.”).  Indeed, even opponents of the current Section 5 admit the original 
coverage formula was effective and appropriate because it “permitted the finding of vote denial 
by a simple formula, eliminating the need to ferret out Fifteenth Amendment violations in an 
unmanageably large number of counties in states with abominable records with respect to black 
voting rights.”  ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND 
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 16 (1987). 
 47. Voting Rights Act of 1965, supra note 9, at § 4(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1973b(a) (2006)). 
 48. Posner, supra note 30, at 63. 
 49. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 14–15 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2445. 
 50. See S. REP. No. 89-162, at 45 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2552 
(“Section 4(a) provides for an ‘escape clause’ under which a State or separate subdivision . . . 
may come into the District Court for the District of Columbia and show that no test or device has 
been used in a discriminatory manner.”). 
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of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”51  Like a 
declaratory judgment action for preclearance, bailout suits would be heard by a 
three-judge panel in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, with any appeal going directly to the Supreme Court.52  The 1965 
Act “required that the bailout litigation be instituted by the political jurisdiction 
that had been designated for coverage”; no local jurisdiction could individually 
seek bailout if it was part of an entire state that was covered.53 
The constitutionality of the Act, including its coverage formula, was 
challenged almost immediately after the Act was signed into law.  In South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach,54 the Supreme Court upheld the challenged portions 
of the Act—including Section 5 and the coverage formula in Section 4(b)—as 
“valid means for carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment.”55  
Specifically, it concluded the coverage formula was constitutional because 
substantial evidence existed that many covered jurisdictions had engaged in 
“recent voting discrimination,” including use of “tests and devices” that served 
as one of the two requirements for coverage.56  Katzenbach also pointed to the 
bailout provision as further support for the Act’s constitutionality, explaining 
that Congress “acknowledge[d] the possibility of overbreadth” in the coverage 
formula and “provide[d] for termination of coverage” when “the danger of 
substantial voting discrimination has not materialized.”57  “In the event the 
formula is improperly applied,” the Court explained, the covered jurisdiction 
“can always go into court and obtain termination of coverage under § 4(b), 
provided it has not been guilty of voting discrimination in recent years.”58 
Between 1967 and 1969, a handful of covered jurisdictions—most notably 
Alaska—achieved bailout with the Attorney General’s consent.59  However, in 
 
 51. Voting Rights Act of 1965, supra note 9, at § 4(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1973b(a)(1)(A)). 
 52. Id.; Paul F. Hancock & Lora L. Tredway, The Bailout Standard of the Voting Rights Act: 
An Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 URB. LAW. 379, 390 (1985). 
 53. Hancock & Tredway, supra note 52, at 390–91. 
 54. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 55. Id. at 337. 
 56. Id. at 329–30. 
 57. Id. at 331. 
 58. Id. at 333. 
 59. These locations apparently were inadvertent “casualties” of the neutral trigger formula.  
For example, in Alaska, cold weather and geographical isolation of parts of the state, rather than 
race discrimination, was responsible for turnout falling below the 50% threshold.  See LAWSON, 
supra note 42, at 423 n.117.  Alaska obtained bailout in 1966, Alaska v. United States, No. 101-
66 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 1966), but was covered again under the 1975 amendment to the Act.  Several 
covered jurisdictions in Arizona, Idaho, and North Carolina also successfully obtained bailout.  
See Hancock & Tredway, supra note 52, at 392, 412–15 (describing bailout of Apache, 
Coconino, and Navajo Counties, Arizona; Elmore County, Idaho; and Wake County, North 
Carolina). 
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Gaston County v. United States,60 the Court essentially closed the door (at least 
until after the 1982 amendments61) to future bailout attempts by jurisdictions 
with a history of de jure segregation in public schools.62  Gaston County, North 
Carolina, was one of the covered jurisdictions in North Carolina because it had 
used a literacy test and fell below the 50% threshold for the 1964 election.63  In 
August 1966, the county brought a bailout suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia, asserting the literacy test had not been used 
for the prohibited purpose or effect of “denying or abridging the right to vote” 
due to race.64  The Justice Department opposed the request on the basis that 
Gaston County’s “separate and inferior” school system had the discriminatory 
effect of making it more difficult for black voters to pass the required literacy 
test.65  The District Court agreed, finding “the Negro schools were of inferior 
quality in fact as well as in law,” and thus Gaston County could not carry its 
burden of proving the test’s nondiscrimination.66  On appeal, the Supreme 
Court affirmed, finding that all persons of voting age who were educated in the 
county “attended racially separate and unequal schools.”67  As a result, Gaston 
County had “deprived its black residents of equal educational opportunities, 
which in turn deprived them of an equal chance to pass the literacy test.”68 
Although disclaiming “any per se rule” that a history of segregated schools 
in a covered jurisdiction—as nearly all locations in the South had—made it 
impossible to achieve bailout, that was the practical effect of the Gaston 
County decision as no Southern jurisdiction was able to achieve bailout until 
the 1990s.  For example, in 1974 the state of Virginia attempted to bail out 
from coverage.  Relying on Gaston County, the District Court rejected its 
claim, holding that Virginia’s use of a literacy test, coupled with its history of 
segregated schools, had a discriminatory effect due to “the causal connection 
between the maintenance of inferior schools for blacks and their lesser ability 
to pass Virginia’s literacy requirement.”69  As a result, the bailout provision 
was practically a dead letter for most covered jurisdictions. 
 
 60. 395 U.S. 285 (1969). 
 61. See infra Part I.C. 
 62. Gaston Cnty., 395 U.S. at 288. 
 63. Id. at 286–87. 
 64. Id. at 287. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 288 (quoting Gaston Cnty. v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 678, 689 n.23 (D.D.C. 
1968)). 
 67. Id. at 293–94. 
 68. Gaston Cnty., 395 U.S. at 291. 
 69. Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (D.D.C. 1974), aff’d, 420 U.S. 901 
(1975). 
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B. 1970 and 1975 Renewals 
In 1970 and again in 1975, Congress reauthorized the temporary remedial 
provisions of the Act, including Section 5, for additional five and seven-year 
periods, respectively.70  This was accomplished by lengthening the period 
during which a covered jurisdiction could not have used a prohibited “test or 
device” with a discriminatory purpose or effect to be eligible for bailout.71  
This had the effect of “freezing” the beginning of the compliance period at 
1965, meaning jurisdictions that used a discriminatory “test or device” then 
would remain covered.72 
In both 1970 and 1975, Congress extended Section 4(b)’s coverage 
formula to include any locations that used a “test or device” for voting and had 
voter registration or turnout of less than 50% for the most recent presidential 
elections in 1968 and 1972.73  In addition, during the 1975 renewal, Section 5 
protection was extended to “language minorities” by amending the definition 
of a prohibited “test and device” to include jurisdictions where a language 
minority group was at least five percent (5%) of the citizen voting-age 
population and where election materials were provided only in English.74  
Examining voter registration and participation rates, along with other evidence 
presented by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committees found there was “a systematic pattern of voting 
discrimination and exclusion against minority group citizens who are from 
environments in which the dominant language is other than English.”75  For 
example, the Senate explained: 
The State of Texas . . . has a substantial minority population, comprised 
primarily of Mexican Americans and blacks.  Evidence before the 
subcommittee documented that Texas also has a long history of discriminating 
against members of both minority groups in ways similar to the myriad forms 
of discrimination practiced against blacks in the South.76 
Congress concluded that “[p]ersons of Spanish heritage” were the “most 
severely affected by discriminatory [voting] practices, while the documentation 
 
 70. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§ 2–6, 84 Stat. 314, 314–
15; Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400. 
 71. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, supra note 70, at § 3; Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1975, supra note 70, at § 101; see also Timothy O’Rourke, Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982: The New Bailout Provision and Virginia, 69 VA. L. REV. 765, 775 (1983). 
 72. O’Rourke, supra note 71, at 775. 
 73. Id.; see also McDonald, supra note 43, at 257–59 (describing the 1970 and 1975 
reauthorizations). 
 74. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, supra note 70, at § 203. 
 75. S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 24 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 790; H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-196, at 16 (1975).  See generally David H. Hunter, The 1975 Voting Rights Act and 
Language Minorities, 25 CATH. U. L. REV. 250 (1976). 
 76. S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 25 (1975). 
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concerning Asian Americans, American Indians, and Alaskan Natives was also 
substantial.”77  As a result, it extended Section 5 coverage to these areas as 
well. 
The revised coverage formulas in 1970 and 1975 added the entire states of 
Alaska, Arizona, and Texas; the boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the 
Bronx in New York City; and a small number of local municipalities in 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Maine, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.78  A number of these 
newly added, non-Southern jurisdictions—which often had few minority 
voters—subsequently were able to bail out of coverage between 1975 and 
1982.79  In Maine, eighteen municipalities covered under the 1970 renewal 
were bailed out with the Attorney General’s consent.80  Similarly, the three 
covered counties in New Mexico and the two covered counties in Oklahoma 
covered under the 1975 language minority amendment achieved bailout 
because the members of the affected language group were found to be fluent in 
English.81 
Other jurisdictions, however, received less favorable results in bailout 
litigation.  The Supreme Court denied bailout for the City of Rome, Georgia, 
because it was ineligible for bailout as a subdivision of a state that was 
separately covered under Section 5.82  The Attorney General also successfully 
opposed bailouts sought by the state of Alaska (which had been re-covered by 
the 1975 language amendments); Yuba County, California; and El Paso 
County, Colorado.83  And in 1972, the federal government initially consented 
to the bailout of the three boroughs of New York City—Manhattan, Brooklyn, 
and the Bronx—covered under the 1970 renewal; but in 1973, this litigation 
was reopened on the Attorney General’s motion after finding these counties 
had used a discriminatory test or device, and they were re-covered in 1974.84 
 
 77. Id. at 31. 
 78. McDonald, supra note 43, at 257–59. 
 79. Hancock & Tredway, supra note 52, at 403. 
 80. Maine v. United States, No. 75-2125 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 1976), referenced in Hancock & 
Tredway, supra note 52, at 403. 
 81. New Mexico v. United States, No. 76-0067 (D.D.C. July 30, 1976); Choctaw & 
McCurtain Cntys. (Okla.) v. United States, No. 76-1250 (D.D.C. May 12, 1976), referenced in 
Hancock & Tredway, supra note 52, at 403. 
 82. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 168 (1980). 
 83. Hancock & Tredway, supra note 52, at 403. 
 84. New York v. United States, No. 2419-71 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 1972), aff’d, 419 U.S. 888 
(1974).  Subsequently, in 1975, Bronx County and Kings County (Brooklyn) were declared 
subject  to preclearance on the separate “language minority” grounds because over 5% of the 
voting-age citizens in those counties were persons of Spanish heritage as of 1972, but registration 
and election materials were provided only in English.  Ravitch v. City of New York, No. 90 Civ. 
5752, 1992 WL 196735, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1992). 
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C. 1982 Amendments 
In 1982, Congress again considered potential amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act and the renewal of its temporary provisions.  A primary focus of the 
1982 legislation was the addition of the so-called “effects test” to Section 285—
which is permanent and has nationwide reach—in response to City of Mobile v. 
Bolden.86  But Congress was also compelled to revisit Section 5 because 
without a modification of the bailout criteria, most covered jurisdictions could 
demonstrate they had not used a prohibited “test or device in a discriminatory 
manner” after 1965 and thus be released from coverage.87 
During hearings in 1981 and 1982, committees in the House and Senate 
heard extensive testimony regarding the continuing need for Section 5 
coverage.  Although conceding there had been vast improvements in the ability 
of minority voters to register and cast ballots in the covered jurisdictions, 
Congress concluded “the nation’s task in securing voting rights is not 
finished.”88  Section 5 objections interposed from 1975 to 1981 demonstrated 
that “covered jurisdictions have substantially moved from direct, over[t] 
impediments to the right to vote to more sophisticated devices that dilute 
minority voting strength,” such as annexations, the use of at-large elections, 
majority vote requirements and/or numbered posts, and redistricting.89  As a 
result, Congress declared there was “virtual unanimity” that Section 5’s 
preclearance requirement should be extended in some fashion.90 
Congress considered but ultimately rejected a straight ten-year extension of 
Act’s temporary provisions, including the existing bailout standard tied to pre-
 
 85. See, e.g., Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1352–57 (1983). 
 86. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 87. As the Senate Judiciary Committee report explained: 
If no further action is taken by Congress . . . virtually all of the remaining jurisdictions 
which came under Section 5 with the original passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 
will be able to show that they have not used a test or device in a discriminatory manner 
for 17 years, that is, since August 6, 1965.  This would constitute a virtual automatic 
termination of Section 5 coverage as to those jurisdictions. 
S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 43–44 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 178, 222. 
 88. Id. at 9–10, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 186–87. 
 89. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 187.  For a more detailed explanation of 
how these devices acted to dilute minority voting strength, see Peyton McCrary, Christopher 
Seaman & Richard Valelly, The End of Preclearance As We Knew It:  How the Supreme Court 
Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 275, 292–99 (2006). 
 90. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 9 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 178, 186.  See 
generally Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: 
The Continued Need for Preclearance, 51 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
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1965 use of discriminatory tests or devices,91 because it would provide no 
incentive for covered jurisdictions to take affirmative steps to remedy past and 
present discrimination against minority voters.92  Instead, it enacted a twenty-
five year extension of the preclearance requirement and the existing coverage 
formula and combined it with a new bailout mechanism that was designed to 
“permit an effective and orderly transition to the time when such exceptional 
remedies as preclearance are no longer necessary.”93  The Senate Judiciary 
Committee’s report explained: 
The revised bailout mechanism is geared to the actual record of conduct in 
each jurisdiction.  Those [jurisdictions] with a record of compliance with the 
law in recent years and a commitment to full opportunity for minority 
participation in the political process could bail out.  Other jurisdictions would 
have to compile such a record in order to become eligible.  Only those 
jurisdictions that insist on retaining discriminatory procedures or otherwise 
inhibit full minority participation would remain subject to preclearance.94 
Thus, the preclearance provision was intended to “work[] in tandem with the 
bailout provision to create a meaningful incentive for jurisdictions to undertake 
the affirmative inclusion efforts bailout demands in order to avoid remaining 
under the coverage regime.”95 
The revised bailout standard adopted in 1982 had two major changes.  
First, it substantially broadened eligibility by permitting a “political 
subdivision” within a covered state to separately seek bailout.96  The 1982 
amendments modified the term “political subdivision” in Section 4(a)’s bailout 
provision by adding the phrase “though such [coverage] determinations were 
not made with respect to such subdivision as a separate unit.”97  As a result of 
this change, “political subdivisions” previously designated for coverage only 
as part of a larger state (e.g., counties in Virginia or Texas) were permitted to 
bail out. 
This change, however, was not intended to expand the scope of what 
constituted a “political subdivision” for purposes of bailout eligibility.  Since 
1965, section 14(c)(2) of the Act defined a “political subdivision” as “any 
 
 91. See, e.g., Boyd & Markman, supra note 85, at 1381 (explaining that Senate Majority 
Leader Howard Baker (R-TN) “wished to avoid prolonged and bitter debate on extension” by 
proposing “a simple ten-year extension of the existing Act”). 
 92. Hancock & Tredway, supra note 52, at 408; see also S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 44 (1982), 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 178, 222 (stating that the purpose of the revised bailout section 
was to “provide incentives to jurisdictions to attain compliance with the law and increas[e] 
participation by minority citizens in the political process of their community.”). 
 93. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 44 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 178, 222. 
 94. Id. at 43, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 221. 
 95. Karlan, supra note 10, at 26–27. 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2006). 
 97. Id. 
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county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted 
under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other 
subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.”98  Thus, political 
subdivisions—such as townships or villages—within counties, parishes, or 
other governmental bodies that registered voters (such as independent cities in 
Virginia) were not permitted to seek bailout, even after 1982, because they 
were not considered a “political subdivision.”99  The legislative history for the 
1982 amendments confirmed Congress’s intent.  The House Judiciary 
Committee report explained “the standard for bail-out is broadened to permit 
political subdivisions, as defined in Section 14(c)(2), in covered states to seek 
bail out although the state itself may remain covered.”100  Similarly, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee explained “[t]owns and cities within [covered] counties 
may not bailout separately” because, “[a]s a practical matter . . . [Congress] 
could not expect that the Justice Department or private groups could remotely 
hope to monitor and to defend the bailout suits.”101 
The second major change to bailout adopted by Congress in 1982 was the 
elimination of the categorical prohibition on bailout for jurisdictions that used 
a discriminatory “test or device” before 1965.  Instead, the new bailout 
standard required the covered jurisdiction demonstrate a record of compliance 
with the Act for the previous ten years.102  Specifically, to obtain bailout, the 
jurisdiction must prove that for the ten-year period immediately preceding 
action: 
(1) it has not used a discriminatory “test or device” with the purpose or effect 
of denying or abridging the right to vote; 
(2) no final court judgments, consent decrees, or settlements have been 
entered against it for discriminatory voting practices; 
(3) no federal examiners have been sent to the jurisdiction; 
(4) the jurisdiction, and all governmental units within its territory, have 
complied with Section 5, including the submission of all election changes 
for preclearance and the repeal of all changes to which objections were 
issued; and 
 
 98. Id. at § 1973k(c)(2) (2006). 
 99. See Richard A. Williamson, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act:  A Statutory 
Analysis of the Revised Bailout Provision, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 40 (1984) (“For purposes of both 
coverage and bailout, the term ‘political subdivision’ meant any county or parish except when 
registration and voting were conducted by independent cities.”). 
 100. H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 2 (1981) (emphasis added). 
 101. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 57 n.192 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 178, 236 n.192. 
 102. O’Rourke, supra note 71, at 782; J. Gerald Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout 
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006:  
PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 262–63 (Ana Hernandez ed., 
2006). 
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(5) no objection has been entered by the Department of Justice or the U.S. 
District Court to any change submitted by the jurisdiction and any 
governmental unit within its territory.103 
In addition, the jurisdiction was required to demonstrate it had taken 
affirmative steps to expand minority participation in the electoral process.  
Under the statute, these steps include: 
(1) the elimination of any dilutive voting or election procedures; 
(2) making constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment 
toward minority voters; and 
(3) other constructive efforts towards increasing minority voter participation 
have been made, “such as expanded opportunities for convenient 
registration and voting” and the appointment of minority election 
officials, at all stages of the election and registration process.104 
Finally, bailout would be unavailable if the jurisdiction had “engaged in 
violations of any provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States or 
any State or political subdivision with respect to discrimination in voting on 
account of race or color” or membership in a minority language group.105  
Trivial violations that were promptly corrected and not repeated, however, 
would not prevent bailout.106 
The amended bailout provision permitted the Attorney General to consent 
to the requested relief if he or she is “satisfied that the State or political 
subdivision has complied with the requirements [for bailout].”107  If bailout is 
granted, the District Court of the District of Columbia retains jurisdiction for a 
ten-year period and “shall reopen the action upon motion of the Attorney 
General or any aggrieved person alleging that conduct has occurred during the 
ten-year period[] . . . [which] would have precluded the issuance of a [bailout] 
judgment.”108  Finally, the new bailout standard was set to come into effect in 
August 1984 to permit the Justice Department to prepare for the large number 
of expected bailout requests.109 
D. Bailout After the 1982 Amendments 
There was significant disagreement during legislative debates about 
whether covered jurisdictions would pursue bailout under the new standard.  
 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)–(E) (2006). 
 104. Id. at § 1973b(a)(1)(F)(i)–(iii). 
 105. Id. at § 1973b(a)(3). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at § 1973b(a)(9). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Williamson, supra note 99, at 33 (“[T]he effective date of the new bailout provision 
has been deferred until August 6, 1984, in order to allow the [Justice] Department to develop 
standards and regulations for the new system.”). 
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Proponents of the new bailout provision, such as the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, asserted it “provide[s] a reasonable avenue for jurisdictions to bail 
out of preclearance at a time appropriate for them.”110  They pointed to an 
analysis by the Joint Center for Political Studies, which examined 808 counties 
in seven southern states wholly covered by Section 5 and estimated 
approximately 25% of covered jurisdictions could bail out in 1984, when the 
new standard took effect.111  Another contemporary study of the state of 
Virginia concluded that about half of the state’s counties and a fifth of its 
independent cities could achieve bailout under the new standard.112  Opponents 
such as Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL), however, argued the new standard made 
bailout “highly unlikely, as a practical matter, thereby changing the temporary 
status of the Act to a more constitutionally suspect permanent condition.”113  
Others, such as Rep. M. Caldwell Butler (R-VA), went even further, blasting 
the 1982 amendment as making “a mockery of the idea of reasonable bailout 
by crafting legislation which would establish requirements impossible to 
achieve.”114 
Ultimately, “the flood of expected bailout litigation . . . never 
materialized.”115  From 1982 to 1984, when the new standard came into effect, 
six bailout suits were filed.  The Attorney General consented to bailouts by 
Campbell County, Wyoming; Elmore County, Idaho; three towns in 
Connecticut; El Paso County, Colorado; and Honolulu County, Hawaii.116  In 
the first three cases, the covered jurisdictions had low minority populations and 
no history of discrimination against black voters.117  The latter two 
jurisdictions were covered under the “language minority” provision of the 
1975 renewal.  El Paso County established to the Justice Department’s 
satisfaction that English-language elections did not have the purpose or effect 
of discriminating against minority voters, while Honolulu County successfully 
demonstrated the English or Hawaiian language literacy test in the Hawaii 
Constitution was not applied in Honolulu prior to its 1968 repeal, and thus 
 
 110. S. REP. NO. 97–417, at 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 183. 
 111. Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992 and H.R. 3112 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 826–28, 830–32 
(1982), discussed in O’Rourke, supra note 71, at 785–86 & n.130; see also S. REP. NO. 97–417, 
at 60 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 238 (citing presentation by Armand Derfner, 
Joint Center for Political Studies, that “showed a reasonable projection of 25 percent of the 
counties in the major covered states being eligible to file for bailout on the basis of their 
compliance with the objective criteria in the compromise bill.”). 
 112. O’Rourke, supra note 71, at 792–800. 
 113. H.R. REP. NO. 97–227, at 57 (1981) (supplemental views of Reps. Henry J. Hyde and 
Dan Lundgren). 
 114. Id. at 64 (dissenting views of Rep. M. Caldwell Butler). 
 115. McDonald, supra note 43, at 261. 
 116. Hancock & Tredway, supra note 52, at 412–15. 
 117. Id. at 412–14. 
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Asian-Americans who were not literate in English could register and vote in 
1965.118  Finally, in 1984, Alaska petitioned for bailout under the minority 
language provisions, but the Justice Department opposed the state’s claim that 
its English-only elections did not have a discriminatory purpose or effect.119  
After the new standard came into effect in August 1984, Alaska sought bailout 
under the new standard, but its petition was unsuccessful, and it presently 
remains covered.120 
No other covered jurisdictions pursued bailout until 1997, when the City of 
Fairfax, Virginia, became the first jurisdiction in a Southern state to bail out 
under the new standard adopted in the 1982 amendments.121  The City of 
Fairfax—which is a suburb of Washington, D.C.—explained it had sought 
bailout “because it was proud of its record of equal registration and voting 
opportunities, and the bailout gave the City a public and official declaration 
that all aspects of the City’s political process were equally open to all its 
citizens.”122  From 1997 through 2008, an additional 16 jurisdictions—all 
counties or independent cities located in Virginia—obtained bailout, all with 
the Attorney General’s consent.123  Most recently, two municipalities in North 
Carolina and Georgia were granted bailout in 2010.124  Notably, no jurisdiction 
has filed a bailout lawsuit since 1984 and been rejected.125 
 
 118. Id. at 414–15. 
 119. Id. at 415 (referencing Alaska v. United States, No. 84–1362 (D.D.C. 1984)). 
 120. Id. at 415; Voting Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., Section 5 Covered 
Jurisdictions, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last visited Dec. 20, 
2010). 
 121. Hebert, supra note 102, at Appendix A; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Jurisdictions That 
Have Bailed Out Under the Voting Rights Act in Support of Appellees at 6, Nw. Austin Mun. 
Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (No. 08–322) [hereinafter Amici Brief of 
Bailed Out Jurisdictions]. 
 122. Amici Brief of Bailed Out Jurisdictions, supra note 121, at 6–7. 
 123. See id. at 7 & Ex. B (identifying the additional bailed-out jurisdictions in Virginia as 
Frederick, Shenandoah, Roanoke, Rockingham, Warren, Greene, Augusta, Botetourt, Essex, 
Page, Washington, Middlesex, and Amherst Counties, and Winchester, Harrisonburg, and Salem 
Cities). 
 124. Consent Judgment and Decree, City of Kings Mountain v. Holder, No. 1:10-CV-01153, 
2010 WL 4228358 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2010) (awarding bailout to City of Kings Mountain, North 
Carolina); Consent Judgment and Decree, City of Sandy Springs v. Holder, No. 1:10-CV-01502 
(D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/sandy_springs_ 
cd.pdf. 
 125. Amici Brief of Bailed Out Jurisdictions, supra note 121, at 7. 
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II.  THE FLAWS OF THE CURRENT BAILOUT SYSTEM 
Why, then, have initial projections of widespread bailout proven 
inaccurate?126  Although not entirely clear, this article suggests five likely 
reasons why more covered jurisdictions have not pursued bailout. 
First, many eligible jurisdictions simply may be unaware that bailout is an 
alternative to continued coverage.127  For example, the fact that all but two 
jurisdictions that have achieved bailout since 1984 are located in Virginia 
appears related to the City of Fairfax’s successful bailout, which eventually led 
other local governments to follow suit.128  In addition, Virginia attorney and 
former Voting Section official J. Gerald Hebert has developed a specialty of 
representing political subdivisions seeking bailout, and he has helped increase 
awareness of its availability through presentations at statewide meetings of 
Virginia’s local government attorney associations and local election 
officials.129  Thus, rather than some “anomaly” specific to Virginia, as Justice 
Thomas has claimed,130 the reason that most recent bailouts have occurred 
there is probably due to increased awareness within the state. 
Second, even if a jurisdiction knows bailout is a possibility, it may be 
perceived as prohibitively expensive to pursue.131  For example, Hans von 
Spakovsky, a former political appointee in the Justice Department during the 
George W. Bush administration, has claimed “[b]ailout can be an extremely 
expensive ordeal, particularly for cash-strapped municipalities and counties,” 
requiring the hiring of “expert witnesses” and “a voting-law attorney” that 
could “easily run into the tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars.”132  In 
reality, however, the actual cost of bailout appears to be much lower.  When a 
jurisdiction is willing to gather the required data, “the legal fees for the entire 
 
 126. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2519 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
& dissenting in part) (asserting the “promise of a bailout opportunity has, in the great majority of 
cases, turned out to be no more than a mirage.”). 
 127. See Amici Brief of Bailed Out Jurisdictions, supra note 121, at 8 (“[M]any local officials 
are unaware of the bailout option.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Hancock & 
Tredway, supra note 52, at 422 (“Individual counties within covered states may be unaware of the 
opportunity for an independent bailout action under the [1982] standard.”). 
 128. See Amici Brief of Bailed Out Jurisdictions, supra note 121, at 8 (“News of Fairfax’s 
bailout . . . became a topic of conversation at meetings of Virginia’s local government attorney 
association and annual meetings of Virginia local election officials.”). 
 129. Id. at 8–9. 
 130. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2519 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
& dissenting in part). 
 131. See Amici Brief of Bailed Out Jurisdictions, supra note 121, at 11 (“Local officials may 
mistakenly believe that bailing out is not cost-effective . . . .” (internal quotations and citation 
omitted)). 
 132. Hans A. von Spakovsky, Voting Rights and the Other Bailouts, NATIONAL REVIEW 
ONLINE (May 5, 2009), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/181399/voting-rights-and-other-
bailouts/hans-von-spakovsky. 
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process of obtaining a bailout are less than $5000.”133  In addition, no 
successful bailout case has required a jurisdiction to hire an expert witness.134 
Nonetheless, the cost of bailout still may be perceived as high compared to 
continued coverage under Section 5, particularly since many jurisdictions have 
routinized the process of administrative preclearance through the Justice 
Department.  As explained in an amici brief submitted in NAMUDNO by six 
states covered in whole or in part under Section 5, the procedure for making a 
preclearance submission to the Justice Department is “the most streamlined 
administrative process known to the federal government.”135  Only a limited 
amount of data is required in connection with the submission. 
The covered jurisdiction must provide: a copy of the statute, ordinance, or 
procedure being changed; a copy of the proposed statute, ordinance or 
procedure; an explanation of the differences between the two if not readily 
apparent from the face of the documents; contact information for the person 
making the submission; the statute or other authority that provides the 
authority for making the change; the date of adoption; the effective date of the 
change; a statement that the change has not yet been enforced; the reasons for 
the change; the anticipated effect on minority voters; identification of all 
litigation concerning the change; and a statement that the prior practice has 
been precleared.136 
According to these covered jurisdictions, “[t]he time and cost to make a 
preclearance submission is relatively small”—the average submission, 
excluding complex changes like redistricting and municipal annexations, 
“requires less than one hour of personnel time to prepare.”137  The average cost 
for preparation of a submission has been estimated as $500.138  Finally, this 
information can be submitted to the Justice Department electronically through 
the Internet.139  As a result, for most changes, “[t]he task of preparing the 
submission is usually a fraction of the work involved in making the voting 
 
 133. Amici Brief of Bailed Out Jurisdictions, supra note 121, at 11–12 (quoting The Voting 
Rights Act:  An Examination of the Scope and Criteria for Coverage Under the Special 
Provisions of the Act:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 90 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing on Scope and Criteria for Coverage] 
(statement of J. Gerald Hebert, Esq.)). 
 134. J. Gerald Hebert, Facts: 1 Spakovsky Speculation: 0, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. BLOG 
(May 6, 2009), http://www.clcblog.org/blog_item-284.html. 
 135. Brief for the States of North Carolina, Arizona, California, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
New York as Amici Curiae in Support of Eric H. Holder, Jr., et al. at 6, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. 
Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08–322) [hereinafter Amici Brief of Covered States] (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 
 136. Id. at 7–8 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 51.27 (2008)). 
 137. Id. at 8. 
 138. Hebert, supra note 102, at 271. 
 139. Amici Brief of Covered States, supra note 135, at 6. 
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change” itself.140  Thus, the ease of preclearance may create a perverse 
incentive regarding bailout: “covered jurisdictions that could bail out most 
easily may find coverage to be least burdensome.”141  For example, the 
covered political subdivisions in Michigan and New Hampshire have few 
minority voters and have never received a preclearance objection, but these 
jurisdictions have never (at least to the author’s knowledge) attempted to bail 
out.142 
Third, the benefits of continued compliance with Section 5 may serve as a 
disincentive to pursue bailout for some otherwise-eligible jurisdictions.  In 
return for the low cost of coverage, covered jurisdictions obtain several 
valuable benefits.  First, as Professor Nathaniel Persily has explained, a grant 
of preclearance by the Justice Department provides “a certain signal as to the 
legality of a voting change.”143  While preclearance does not prevent a 
subsequent challenge to the change in court, a failure to object after an 
objective review by federal authorities may “deter litigation that otherwise 
would have materialized if the voting change had not been vetted.”144  
Preclearance also helps “prevent covered jurisdictions from implementing 
discriminatory changes” that can be challenged in expensive and lengthy 
litigation under Section 2 of the Act, and thus serves as a “cost-effective means 
of preventing litigation.”145  In addition, preclearance can serve as a federal 
“stamp of approval” for the covered jurisdiction to help establish it is not 
discriminating against minority voters.146  Finally, some covered jurisdictions 
assert “the preclearance process substantially benefits [them] by encouraging 
the input of minority voters at an early stage of a State’s efforts to change its 
election practices and procedures.”147  Thus, some jurisdictions likely have 
concluded the benefits of continued Section 5 coverage outweigh even the 
relatively low costs of bailout. 
Fourth, some jurisdictions may have failed to pursue bailout because they 
were unsure about their eligibility under the current complex, multi-
requirement test.  As explained above, the current bailout standard has 
“numerous objective criteria,”148 including that the jurisdiction has not been 
 
 140. Understanding the Costs and Benefits of Section 5 Pre-Clearance:  Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 81 (2006). 
 141. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 
174, 213 (2007). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 213–14. 
 145. Amici Brief of Covered Jurisdictions, supra note 121, at 16. 
 146. Id. at 15 (testimony of J. Gerald Hebert). 
 147. Id. at 13. 
 148. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2518 (2009) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). 
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subject to any final judgments or consent decrees in Section 2 litigation 
regarding a discriminatory denial or abridgement of the right to vote and that 
the covered jurisdiction—including all jurisdictions within its borders—has 
fully complied with its Section 5 obligations for the past ten years.149  The 
latter requirement is often cited as the most difficult because bailout opponents 
may be able to “find one or more changes, however small, that were not 
precleared,” by either the jurisdiction itself or another governmental entity 
within its borders, such as a township or local school district.150 
In addition, the bailout provisions contain several “subjective criteria”151 
requiring equal access and participation in the electoral process by minority 
voters.152  But based on the statutory language, it may be unclear precisely 
what steps, if any, a covered jurisdiction must take to satisfy these 
requirements.  Although proponents of the current bailout system insist its 
requirements are not difficult to satisfy,153 from a covered jurisdiction’s 
perspective, the current standard could be viewed as a high bar to clear, even if 
it has a clean record on vote discrimination.154  This uncertainty may have 
served—and continues to serve—as a deterrent for numerous eligible 
jurisdictions. 
Finally, some covered jurisdictions may not have pursued bailout because, 
although they have fully complied with their responsibilities under the Voting 
Rights Act, one (or more) governmental subdivision(s) within their boundaries 
have not.  As mentioned above, before NAMUDNO,155 a covered jurisdiction 
had to establish it, “and all governmental units within that jurisdiction,” 
satisfied all of its obligations under Section 5, including timely submitting all 
changes for preclearance review and repealing all changes that have prompted 
 
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)–(E) (2006). 
 150. Hebert, supra note 102, at 272. 
 151. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
& dissenting in part). 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(F)(i)–(iii) (2006). 
 153. Hebert, supra note 102, at 272 (“[I]n my view, . . . the requirements for bailing out are 
not too onerous . . . .”); see also id. at 275. 
 154. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue in Support of 
Appellant at 20–26, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08–322). 
 155. As explained in Part IV, infra, after NAMUDNO, covered jurisdictions are eligible for 
bailout on a “piecemeal” basis—that is, a covered local governmental body (e.g., a county) may 
achieve bailout even if it is part of a larger political body (e.g., a state) that remains covered under 
Section 5.  While not expressly addressing this issue, the logic of the “symmetry” principle 
articulated in NAMUDNO—that bailout and preclearance should be addressed separately for each 
covered “political subdivision”—makes it appear likely that, going forward, a covered 
jurisdiction (e.g., a county) would not need to establish that all political subdivisions located 
within its borders (e.g., a township or village) have also separately complied with Section 5.  Nw. 
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2516. 
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an objection.156  For example, in 1999, Kings County, California, informed the 
Justice Department it intended to pursue bailout, but upon learning political 
subdivisions within the county’s boundaries had enacted a number of voting 
changes without obtaining preclearance, it subsequently withdrew its bailout 
request.157 
III.  A MISSED OPPORTUNITY: COVERAGE AND BAILOUT IN THE 2006 VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION ACT 
“The Voting Rights Act must continue to exist—and exist in its current 
form.”158 
 Rep. James Sensenbrenner 
 Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (2005) 
A. The Debate Regarding Reauthorization 
As the Act’s temporary provisions, including Section 5, approached 
expiration in 2007, scholars, voting rights advocates, and other interested 
parties debated whether, and in what form, Section 5 coverage and 
preclearance should be continued.  Proponents of reauthorizing Section 5 
argued that while it had “accomplished much during its first forty years,” it 
should be renewed because “more remain[ed] to be done in order to protect the 
rights of racial and ethnic minorities to fully and equally participate in the 
electoral process.”159  In particular, they pointed to the record of Section 5 
objections by the Justice Department and litigation under Section 2 of the Act 
since the 1982 renewal as evidence of continued discrimination against 
minority voters in covered jurisdictions.160  Proponents also asserted renewal 
 
 156. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(D) (2006) (emphasis added); Hebert, supra note 102, at 264. 
 157. Hebert, supra note 102, at 267–68. 
 158. Rep. Sensenbrenner to Introduce 25-Year Voting Rights Extension Legislation, Calls for 
Bipartisan Approach to Civil Rights Issues, U.S. FED. NEWS, July 10, 2005, available at 2005 
WLNR 10836466 (emphasis added), quoted in James Thomas Tucker, The Politics of 
Persuasion: Passage of the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization Act of 2006, 33 J. LEGIS. 205, 217 
(2007). 
 159. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS: THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT AT WORK 1982-2005, at 103 (2006), http://www.lawyerscommittee. 
org/admin/voting_rights/documents/files/0023.pdf [hereinafter THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AT 
WORK]; see also Hearing on Scope and Criteria for Coverage, supra note 133, at 4 (statement of 
Rep. Bobby Scott (D-VA)) (explaining that while the Act “has guaranteed millions of minority 
voters a chance to have their voices heard and their votes counted” and led to the election of 
thousands of minority officials, the Act’s temporary provisions should be renewed because they 
are “essential to ensure fairness in our political process and equal opportunity for minorities in 
American politics.”). 
 160. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AT WORK, supra note 159, at 54–88, 98–102; Ellen Katz et 
al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting:  Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting 
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was important because of the “deterrent function” of Section 5: the 
preclearance requirement itself effectively prevented many covered 
jurisdictions from attempting changes that might discriminate against minority 
voters.161 
In contrast, renewal opponents argued that while Section 5 had been 
“amazingly effective” at increasing minority participation in the political 
process, Congress should permit it to expire as scheduled for several 
reasons.162  First, they pointed to evidence that black voters now registered and 
voted at levels comparable to whites in covered jurisdictions,163 as well as the 
low percentage of objections under Section 5 in recent years,164 as evidence 
conditions in the covered jurisdictions had changed so dramatically that special 
remedial treatment was no longer warranted.165  In other words, as Samuel 
 
Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 643 (2006) (study investigating findings in 331 
lawsuits under Section 2 since 1982). 
 161. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 10, at 22–24. 
 162. Abigail Thernstrom & Edward Blum, Do the Right Thing, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2005, at 
A10. 
 163. See, e.g., EDWARD BLUM & LAUREN CAMPBELL, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., ASSESSMENT 
OF VOTING RIGHTS PROGRESS IN JURISDICTIONS COVERED UNDER SECTION FIVE OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 3–5, tbl. 1 (2006) (asserting that “by 2000, the gaps between white and 
blacks in [voter registration and turnout] had virtually been eliminated” and that “in some section 
5 jurisdictions, minority registration and turnout rates exceed those of whites.”).  However, as 
Nate Persily has explained, this study erred in one prominent respect by including Hispanics—
some of whom are not citizens and thus ineligible to registered to vote—as part of “whites” in the 
comparison.  Persily, supra note 141, at 197. 
 164. See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of 
the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 192–93 (2005) (finding that 
preclearance objections dropped from 4.06% of submissions in 1968–1972 to 0.05% of 
submissions in 1998–2002).  As I have previously argued, however, at least part of this decrease 
in objections is likely due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Reno v. Bossier Parish School 
Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (“Bossier II”), which dramatically reduced the scope of the 
“purpose” prong of Section 5, rather than a change in the level of discriminatory behavior by 
covered jurisdictions.  See McCrary, Seaman & Valelly, supra note 89, at 313–15, 322–23.  In 
addition, other scholars have attempted to assess whether the low number of Section 5 objections 
since 2000 is partly the result of political considerations by appointees in the Justice Department 
in the George W. Bush administration.  See generally Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel E. 
Charles, The Politics of Preclearance, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 513 (2007); MARK A. POSNER, 
THE POLITICIZATION OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DECISIONMAKING UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: IS IT A PROBLEM AND WHAT SHOULD CONGRESS DO? (2006), available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/node/2176. 
 165. See Thernstrom & Blum, supra note 162, at A10 (asserting that “[t]imes have changed” 
and “[t]he emergency that justified the [Act’s] temporary provisions is long over”); see also 
Voting Rights Act: Section 5—Preclearance Standards, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the  H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 38 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing on 
Section 5 Preclearance Standards] (statement of Roger Clegg, Vice Pres. and Gen. Counsel, Ctr. 
for Equal Opportunity). 
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Issacharoff has explained, they questioned “whether the successes of the VRA 
have compromised its mission.”166  Second, opponents argued in light of these 
changed conditions, there was serious doubt whether the reauthorization of 
Section 5 in its current form could satisfy the “congruence and proportionality” 
test articulated in City of Boerne v. Flores167 for determining the 
constitutionality of legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s remedial power 
in the Fifteenth Amendment.168  Third, they asserted the continued designation 
of certain states for special treatment under Section 5 impermissibly interfered 
with their sovereignty169 by forcing them “to continue to wear the badge of 
shame that is preclearance.”170  Fourth, some opponents of Section 5 claimed 
continuing preclearance promoted “racial classifications” and “political 
apartheid.”171 
Despite these objections, congressional renewal of Section 5 in some form 
was widely expected.172  In addition to unanimous support among 
congressional Democrats, supporters of renewing Section 5 included House 
Judiciary Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) as well as Senate Majority 
 
 166. Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of its Own Success?, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1714 (2004). 
 167. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
 168. Hearing on Section 5 Preclearance Standards, supra note 165, at 39 (2006) (statement 
of Roger Clegg, Vice Pres. and Gen. Counsel, Ctr. for Equal Opportunity); Modern Enforcement 
of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 22–24 
(2006) (testimony of Gregory S. Coleman). 
 169. See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 294 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“The section’s interference with state sovereignty is quite drastic—covered States and political 
subdivisions may not give effect to their policy choices affecting voting without first obtaining 
the Federal Government’s approval.”). 
 170. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. 
Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 06-1384). 
 171. Understanding the Benefits and Costs of Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11–13 (2006) (testimony of Abigail Thernstrom, Senior 
Fellow, The Manhattan Inst.); see also Hearing on Section 5 Preclearance Standards, supra note 
165, at 31 (testimony of Roger Clegg, Vice Pres. and Gen. Counsel, Ctr. for Equal Opportunity). 
 172. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 
1965-2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 746 (2008) (asserting that “almost everyone expected Congress 
to renew Section 5 in some form”); see also Rick Lyman, Extension of Voting Act Is Likely 
Despite Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at A14 (describing the law as in “little danger of 
expiring”); Jeffrey McMurray, Georgia Republicans Challenging Voting Rights Act Renewal, 
Likely in Vain, MOBILE REGISTER, Nov. 20, 2005, at B6 (“Although it doesn’t expire until 2007, 
continuation of Section 5—the  provision involving federal preclearance of voting laws—seems a 
foregone conclusion.”); Voting Rights Act to Get Review, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 17, 2005, 
at B2 (quoting Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH), Chairman of the House Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, as stating it was “quite likely” the temporary provisions of the Act “will be 
reauthorized either in the same or similar form.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
36 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX:9 
Leader Bill Frist (R-TN).173  In 2005 and early 2006, President George W. 
Bush also made supportive, if vague, statements regarding the Act’s 
renewal.174  Nevertheless, rank-and-file Republicans, particularly in the House, 
were divided over some of the key temporary provisions, including Section 5 
and the language minority provisions.175 
B. VRARA in the House 
It was also widely recognized that although all previous renewals of 
Section 5 had been found constitutional,176 another reauthorization for an 
additional twenty-five years could be vulnerable to challenge under City of 
Boerne.177  Thus, starting in 2005, congressional committees held a series of 
hearings in both the House and the Senate to “assemble a record demonstrating 
the persistence of discrimination in voting in the covered jurisdictions”178 in 
preparation for the almost-inevitable litigation following renewal.179 
Between October 2005 and April 2006, the House Subcommittee on the 
Constitution received testimony from forty-six witnesses, “including State and 
local elected officials, scholars, attorneys, and other representatives from the 
 
 173. Kousser, supra note 172, at 752; Tucker, supra note 158, at 211–12. 
 174. Tucker, supra note 158, at 211. 
 175. Id. at 207–08; see also id. at 210 (“[S]ome conservatives were at best skeptical, and at 
worst hostile, towards Justice Department oversight of voting changes under Section 5 of the 
Act.”). 
 176. Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 287 (1999) (1982 reauthorization); City of 
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (1975 renewal); Georgia v. United States, 411 
U.S. 526, 541 (1973) (1970 renewal). 
 177. See Hasen, supra note 164, at 206–07 (asserting that “it is far from clear whether 
Congress will be able to make the case to satisfy the Supreme Court that the ‘uncommon’ 
preclearance rationale is ‘congruent and proportional’” and supporters of renewing Section 5 
“need to consider making the strongest evidentiary record of intentional discriminatory conduct in 
voting by states to justify preclearance provision”); Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 226–37 (2003) (focusing on 
“the basic question of whether another extension of Section 5 will pass muster” under City of 
Boerne and subsequent cases); Posner, supra note 30, at 123–24 (arguing that the evidence 
demonstrates “Congress has full authority to reauthorize section 5” under the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments); Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout Provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act Are Still a Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
69, 74–75 (2003). 
 178. Persily, supra note 141, at 182; see also Hearing on Section 5 Preclearance Standards, 
supra note 160, at 4 (2006) (statement of Rep. Robert C. Scott (D-VA)) (“The purpose of these 
hearings is to establish a record to justify the reauthorization of section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act.”); Hearing on Scope and Criteria for Coverage, supra note 133, at 3 (statement of Rep. 
Jerrold Nadler (D-NY)) (“Congress needs to make a strong factual record supporting [Section 
5’s] remedies, given recent Supreme Court decisions.”). 
 179. See Pitts, supra note 177, at 226 (“[I[f Congress chooses to extend Section 5, it will 
almost certainly be subjected to another challenge as an inappropriate exercise of congressional 
enforcement power—a challenge it may not survive.”). 
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voting and civil rights communities.”180  These hearings produced over 12,000 
pages of testimony and evidence,181 including reports from the National 
Commission on the Voting Rights Act,182 the American Civil Liberties 
Union,183 and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, regarding 
discrimination in the covered jurisdictions and other evidence and arguments 
that these organizations argued weighed in favor of renewal.184  Based in part 
on this evidence, the House Judiciary Committee concluded “reauthorization 
of [the temporary] provisions is both justified and necessary.”185  Specifically, 
the Committee’s report pointed to numerous objections to covered jurisdictions 
in the states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Virginia since 1982 as evidence of Section 5’s “effectiveness in addressing 
efforts to discriminate.”186 
Most legislators and witnesses in House committee hearings did not 
believe Congress should alter the existing coverage formula or bailout 
standard.187  For example, Rep. Mel Watt, Chairman of the Congressional 
Black Caucus and a leader of the Democrat’s efforts to renew the Act, 
contended: 
There are obviously those who contend that the coverage formula of the 
Voting Rights Act is outdated and unfair, insofar as it covers certain 
jurisdictions but not others.  There is no doubt that there are any number of 
inventive triggers that Congress could have enacted.  I believe, however that 
the central question before us during this process is not what Congress could 
have done, but whether what we have established as the coverage mechanism 
in the Voting Rights Act is justified by the facts.  Covered jurisdictions, simply 
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put, are covered because they have not only a history of discriminatory 
practices, but have a history of ongoing discrimination as well.188 
Likewise, Armand Derfner, a voting rights attorney from South Carolina, 
testified that although “there has been speculation about whether continuing 
the section 4 trigger [formula] will still be constitutional,” he believed there 
was no need for change: 
I litigate in other covered states as well as South Carolina, and am familiar 
enough with some of those states to be confident that the record presented to 
you in these hearings will show that the types of problems I have outlined here 
are widespread in the covered jurisdictions.  Based on the record I expect you 
will see, there will be ample justification for continuing to provide special 
remedies in the covered jurisdictions, based on the eminently rational and well-
tailored coverage formula of the section 4 trigger.189 
In addition, he did not favor altering the existing bailout standard: 
[S]ection 4 also contains a carefully tailored bailout [provision] . . . which is 
essentially a “reverse trigger” that a covered jurisdiction can use to end 
coverage.  With a rational coverage formula, with a record continuing to justify 
that formula, and with a nuanced bailout in place, the Voting Rights Act is 
exactly the kind of congruent and proportional remedy that satisfies the 
Constitution.190 
Similarly, J. Gerald Hebert, the attorney from Virginia who represented most 
covered jurisdictions that have successfully bailed out since 1982, asserted the 
current bailout standard is “perfectly tailored” to address “the issues that 
Congress was concerned about when it enacted the Voting Rights Act in the 
first place.”191 
During floor debate, a group of conservative Republican House 
members—mainly from covered jurisdictions in the South—attempted to 
dramatically modify Section 5’s scope.  Rep. Charlie Norwood (R-GA) argued 
Georgia had been unfairly “put in the penalty box of section 5.”192  As an 
alternative, he offered an amendment that would “update” the Section 5 
coverage formula using voter registration and turnout rates from a “rolling test 
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based off of the last three presidential elections.193  Under the Norwood 
amendment, a jurisdiction would be covered under Section 5 only if it used a 
discriminatory test or had voter turnout of less than fifty percent (50%) in any 
of these elections.194  According to Rep. Norwood, his amendment would 
cover 1,010 jurisdictions in thirty-nine states.195  However, it was widely 
recognized this “update” would likely make Section 5 more vulnerable to a 
constitutional challenge, because many of the covered jurisdictions had no 
history of voting discrimination.196  For example, the state of Hawaii—which 
does not have a history of voting discrimination—would be the only state 
entirely covered by Section 5 under Norwood’s proposal.197  The House 
defeated the amendment 318 to 96.198 
Rep. Lynn Westmoreland (R-GA) offered another amendment for an 
“expedited, proactive” procedure for bailout that would “requir[e] the 
Department of Justice to assemble a list of all jurisdictions eligible for bailout” 
and notify them of eligibility.199  The Westmoreland amendment would also 
require the Attorney General to consent to the entry of a declaratory judgment 
for bailout if a jurisdiction appeared on this list.200  Rep. Westmoreland—who 
was highly critical of a “straight” reauthorization of Section 5201—had some 
unlikely allies, including Richard Hasen, a professor and election law expert, 
who argued the amendment would “strengthen[] the act by helping to insulate 
the renewed VRA against [the] inevitable constitutional challenge.”202  
Chairman Sensenbrenner, however, asserted the bailout amendment would 
“redirect limited resources away from voting rights enforcement” and “give the 
executive branch unprecedented and unfettered authority to remove crucial 
voting rights protections.”203  The House defeated the Westmoreland 
amendment, 302 to 118.204  After rejecting several other proposed 
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amendments,205 the House reauthorized Section 5 for an additional twenty-five 
years (until July 2031) on a 390 to 33 vote, leaving both the coverage formula 
and the bailout standard unchanged.206 
C. VRARA in the Senate 
The Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA), 
held nine hearings between April 27 and July 13, 2006.  Senator Specter 
explained while it was “clear that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been 
effective in combating State-sponsored discrimination against minority 
voters,” he argued reauthorization of Section 5 was justified because “there is 
still some discrimination which persists, and any [discrimination] is too much 
on the important right to vote.”207  Like in the House, members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee who favored renewal understood the committee needed to 
develop a record of continued discrimination sufficient to withstand the 
expected constitutional challenge.208 
The Senate committee hearings “featured heated debates concerning the 
constitutionality and desirability” of renewing Section 5 without amending 
either the coverage formula or the bailout criteria.209  For example, Laughlin 
McDonald, the Director of the ACLU’s Voting Rights Project, contended the 
current coverage formula was constitutional after City of Boerne, pointing in 
part to the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Lopez v. Monterey County,210 
which held Congress did not violate any rights constitutionally reserved to 
states by requiring submission of a proposed voting change by a covered 
political subdivision when the change was required by state law and the state 
itself was not separately covered under Section 5.211  Theodore Shaw of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund also argued the existing coverage formula 
“served the purpose of identifying the jurisdictions where the problems 
originally existed,” and the record developed in the House supported 
continuation of the formula because of the “continuing problems in those 
jurisdictions.”212  Similarly, Professor Pamela Karlan testified the existing 
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coverage formula was appropriate because it captured many (but not all) 
jurisdictions with a “long history of racial disenfranchisement and dilution,” as 
well as a record of “contemporary voting discrimination.”213  Where current 
coverage was overinclusive, Karlan concluded the current bailout requirements 
struck “precisely the right balance regarding when covered jurisdictions should 
be relieved of such coverage.”214 
In contrast, Professor Samuel Issacharoff contended “a major source of 
constitutional tension arises with the coverage formula for jurisdictions under 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.”215  He explained most jurisdictions were 
covered under the 1964 presidential election—over forty years ago—and if 
Section 5 was extended for an additional twenty-five years, the youngest 
eligible voter from 1964 would be 86 years old.216  Issacharoff offered several 
suggestions for tailoring the Act that would make it “more likely to withstand 
constitutional challenge.”217  First, he proposed the basic unit of coverage be 
moved from the states to political subdivisions of the states, since the vast 
majority of Section 5 objections in recent years dealt with local election, not 
statewide, changes.218  Second, he advocated a “liberalized bailout provision” 
based on a more objective standard, such as lack of Section 5 objections by the 
Justice Department or the absence of litigation under Section 2 of the Act.219  
In particular, he criticized bailout’s subjective criteria requiring affirmative 
steps toward minority participation in the political process as “ill-defined and 
hard to quantify.”220  Third, Issacharoff suggested consideration of a more 
dramatic change, the implementation of an “intermediate regulatory status less 
onerous than preclearance,” which would mandate public disclosure of voting 
changes, but require Section 2 or other litigation to invalidate it.221  Fourth, he 
advocated removing statewide redistricting from Section 5 coverage, in part 
because redistricting plans had become “a major partisan battleground,” 
opening the door to “partisan temptations” in enforcement by the Justice 
Department.222 
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Professor Richard Hasen also expressed concern about the constitutionality 
of renewing Section 5 without any alterations in its scope of coverage.223  He 
argued “Congress should update the coverage formula based on data indicating 
where intentional state discrimination in voting on the basis of race is now a 
problem or likely to be one in the near future.”224  One method of 
accomplishing this, Hasen suggested, was for Congress to “make it easier for 
covered jurisdictions to bail out from coverage under [S]ection 5 upon a 
showing that the jurisdiction has taken steps to fully enfranchise and include 
minority voters.”225  He suggested bailout would be more effective if the 
Justice Department proactively identified and contacted jurisdictions that 
would likely be eligible for bailout: 
One thing that I think would go a long way toward helping the constitutional 
case and also take off some of the burden in a lot of these jurisdictions is to 
ease the bailout requirements.  For example, if the Department of Justice was 
required to proactively go through, pick out those jurisdictions that meet the 
bailout criteria, and say, you know what, you have no history of 
discrimination, you have taken steps to increase minority voter turnout and 
participation, we think that you should apply for bailout.  If the burden was put 
on the Department of Justice rather than on the States, the States just—they are 
used to—the covered States are used to preclearance.  They know how to do 
that.  Bailout could be made a lot easier, and this would actually also help the 
constitutional case showing that the law is going to then be focused on places 
that continue to have a history of discrimination.226 
D. Congress’s Failure to Amend Coverage or Bailout in VRARA 
Ultimately, the Senate did not adopt any of these proposals and instead 
passed the House bill (H.R. 9), which retained the existing coverage formula 
and bailout criteria, unanimously.227  In part, this may have been because 
adoption of the engrossed House bill would, as James Tucker has suggested, 
“avoid[] the possibility of a protracted battle” in conference committee over 
any differences.228  But more likely, any dramatic change to Section 5’s 
scope—no matter how effective or well-intentioned—probably was politically 
unfeasible because it could have caused an unraveling of the bipartisan 
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coalition that shepherded the bill to passage.  As Professor Nathaniel Persily 
has explained, if Congress had seriously attempted to update the coverage 
formula by “add[ing] or subtract[ing] jurisdictions based on some new 
criteria[,] then the justification for those criteria would [have] become the 
central political and constitutional  question underlying the bill.”229  An 
expansion of coverage would have needed to encompass locations with a 
recent record of discrimination in voting—some of which were located outside 
the South230—but not sweep so broadly that it would appear politically 
motivated or create significant political opposition.231  In addition, the removal 
of a significant number of covered jurisdictions might have resulted in 
accusations by voting rights advocates that Congress was attempting to “gut” 
Section 5. 
There is also a history of Congress making significant amendments to the 
Voting Rights Act only after the Supreme Court has limited existing 
protections for minority voting rights in some way.  For example, after the 
Court’s decision in Mobile v. Bolden, which held the Fifteenth Amendment 
only prohibited intentional racial discrimination in voting,232 Congress 
amended Section 2 in 1982 to supersede this decision and “allow[] plaintiffs to 
establish a Section 2 violation by proving that an electoral practice has a 
discriminatory result.”233  Similarly, in the 2006 amendments, Congress 
overturned both the Court’s 2000 decision in Reno v. Bossier Parish School 
Board234 regarding the intent requirement of Section 5 and the Court’s 2003 
decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft235 regarding the meaning of a “retrogressive” 
effect.236  Indeed, the phenomenon of Congress as a reactive entity to judicial 
decisions, rather than a proactive one that seeks to correct flaws in statutes 
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before the Court can rule upon them, is well-recognized by both political 
scientists and legislative scholars.237 
Finally, supporters in Congress of maintaining the existing coverage 
formula took some comfort in the fact the Supreme Court had previously 
upheld the constitutionality of the existing Section 5 on three separate 
occasions, most recently in 1999.238  Thus, “[i]nertia and familiarity, as well as 
the inherent political difficulties in crafting any election law with partisan 
consequences,” ultimately led to no change of Section 5’s coverage formula.239 
The prospect of amending the bailout provision appeared somewhat more 
promising, however.  Unlike changes to the coverage formula, amending the 
bailout standard would not have necessarily upset “settled expectations” about 
Section 5’s ability to protect minority voting rights.240  Rather, a liberalized 
bailout provision could have facilitated the removal of many “good” 
jurisdictions from coverage, while maintaining it for “bad” ones.  Such a 
change would have made “the constitutionality of the coverage formula easier 
to defend” by making it less overinclusive.241  In addition, Professor Hasen’s 
proposal that the Justice Department identify and contact bailout-eligible 
jurisdictions would have been a straightforward (although potentially resource-
intensive) method to narrow the scope of Section 5 coverage.242  Nonetheless, 
supporters of renewal “were steadfast in their opposition to an altered bailout 
regime.”243  Thus, Congress missed an opportunity to alter the bailout regime 
and increase the likelihood the reauthorized Section 5 would be found 
constitutional. 
IV.  THE NAMUDNO LITIGATION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Less than a month after President George W. Bush signed the VRARA into 
law, the constitutionality of Section 5’s renewal was challenged in court.244  In 
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August 2006, an unlikely plaintiff—a small municipal utility district in 
suburban Austin, Texas—filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, seeking bailout from coverage under Section 5 or, in the 
alternative, a declaratory judgment that Section 5 was unconstitutional.245  The 
plaintiff, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One 
(“NAMUDNO”), was formed in the late 1980s to provide water, sewage, and 
other services to local residents.246  It was required to comply with Section 5 
because the state of Texas had been designated for statewide coverage under 
the 1975 renewal.247  The district did not register voters, but handled its own 
elections and submitted its election changes, such as the movement of a polling 
place, for preclearance.248 
In its complaint, NAMUDNO launched a full-throated attack against 
Section 5’s constitutionality.  It asserted “[t]he § 5 preclearance process is 
costly and burdensome” and represented a “vast waste of public monies and 
resources”249—even though the district later admitted it incurred an annual 
average cost of only $223 for preclearance submissions.250  It also argued the 
preclearance requirement was “a badge of shame that Congress, without any 
cognizable justification, has chosen to continue . . . under a now ancient 
formula” and it “infringes on the rights of an entire generation of voters who 
were not even alive when those practices ended.”251  During litigation, 
NAMUDNO was represented pro bono by Gregory S. Coleman, a conservative 
lawyer who testified against the renewal of Section 5.252  As a result, many 
observers believed the lawsuit’s ultimate objective was to strike down Section 
5 rather than bail out the district.253 
In a lengthy opinion, the District Court rejected both of NAMUDNO’s 
claims.254  Regarding bailout, it explained the text and legislative history of 
Section 4 suggested Congress intended a “political subdivision” eligible for 
bailout “to refer to only section 14(c)(2) political subdivisions—that is, 
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counties, parishes, and voter registering subunits.”255  Because NAMUDNO 
did not register voters, it was unable to pursue bailout.256 
Turning to NAMUDNO’s primary argument, the District Court also 
rejected the claim Section 5 was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s 
power under the Fifteenth Amendment.  Treating NAMUDNO’s claim as a 
facial challenge to Section 5’s constitutionality, the court held its renewal 
satisfied both the more permissive “rational basis” test applied by the Supreme 
Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach and the more stringent “congruence 
and proportionality” standard articulated in City of Boerne v. Flores.257  In 
reaching these conclusions, the District Court considered the “massive 
legislative record” developed during the congressional hearings in 2005 and 
2006, including racial disparities in registration and turnout; Section 5 
objections, enforcement suits, and “more information request” letters;258 
Section 2 litigation; the appointment of federal election observers; the number 
of minority elected officials; and the continued existence of racially polarized 
voting in covered jurisdictions.259  It also found Section 5 operated in a “less 
visible but undeniably powerful manner” by deterring local jurisdictions from 
implementing discriminatory changes.260  Ultimately, the District Court held 
the legislative record “include[d] extensive contemporary evidence of 
intentional discrimination” sufficient to withstand constitutional challenge 
under either test.261 
On appeal, the Supreme Court denied the government’s motion to affirm 
the District Court’s decision and noted probable jurisdiction for appeal.262  In a 
surprise, the Supreme Court reversed the district court, but on narrow statutory 
construction grounds.  The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice John 
Roberts and joined by the entire Court except Justice Clarence Thomas, held 
the definition “political subdivision” in section 14(c)(2) did not apply to 
eligibility for bailout under Section 4.263  While conceding that “[s]tatutory 
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definitions control the meaning of the statutory words . . . in the usual case,” 
the Court concluded this situation was exceptional.264  The majority reasoned 
that previous decisions—specifically, United States v. Sheffield Board of 
Commissioners265 and Dougherty County Board of Education v. White266—had 
established the term “political subdivision” had different meanings for 
coverage under Section 4 and preclearance obligations under Section 5.  In 
other words, the Court contended sometimes a “political subdivision” (for 
purposes of bailout) was not a “political subdivision” (as defined in section 
14(c)(2)).267  This contorted reasoning, however, was undermined by 
legislative history of the 1982 amendments which—as previously explained—
amended Section 4 to permit only “political subdivisions in covered states, as 
defined in Section 14(c)(2), to bail out although the state itself remains 
covered.”268  Nonetheless, the Court concluded “[b]ailout and preclearance 
under § 5 are now governed by a principle of symmetry,” and since “‘all 
political units in a covered State are to be treated for § 5 purposes as though 
they were ‘political subdivisions’ . . . ‘it follows that they should also be 
treated as such for purposes of § 4(a)’s bailout provisions.’”269  As a result, 
“piecemeal bailout” is now permitted under Section 5.270  The Court also 
criticized the Justice Department’s interpretation of bailout eligibility as 
unduly restrictive, arguing it helped “render the bailout provision all but a 
nullity.”271  In sum, the Court ended up adopting a statutory construction that 
“was a manifestly implausible reading of the text”272 which “virtually no 
lawyer” thought could succeed.273 
If the Court’s opinion had simply addressed bailout eligibility, the decision 
would not have been particularly noteworthy.  But Part II of Chief Justice 
 
 264. Id. at 2514 (quoting Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 204 (1949)). 
 265. 435 U.S. 110 (1978). 
 266. 439 U.S. 32 (1978). 
 267. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2515 (“According to these definitions, 
then, the statutory definition of a ‘political subdivision’ in § 14(c)(2) does not apply to every use 
of the term ‘political subdivision’ in the Act.”). 
 268. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 2 (1982) (emphasis added); see supra Part I.C. 
 269. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2516 (quoting City of Rome v. United 
States, 446 U.S. 156, 192 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Leading Cases, Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV. 362, 367 (2009). 
 273. Richard Hasen, Initial Thoughts on NAMUDNO: Chief Justice Roberts Blinked, 
ELECTION LAW BLOG, June 22, 2009, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013903.html (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2010), quoted in Ellen D. Katz, From Bush v. Gore to NAMUDNO:  A Response 
to Professor Amar, 61 FLA. L. REV. 991, 993 (2009); see also Heather K. Gerken, An Uncertain 
Fate for Voting Rights, THE AM. PROSPECT, July 23, 2009, http://www.prospect.org/cs/ 
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Roberts’s decision sent a clear message the Court had “serious misgivings 
about the constitutionality” of the reauthorized Section 5.274  Specifically, it 
explained “[t]he Act’s preclearance requirements and its coverage formula 
raise serious constitutional questions under either [the Katzenbach or City of 
Boerne] test.”275 
Regarding the preclearance requirement itself, the opinion noted Section 5 
“impose[d] substantial ‘federalism costs’” by “authoriz[ing] federal intrusion 
into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking” regarding elections.276  
This particular objection, however, is not new—in fact, it is nearly as old as 
Section 5 itself.  In Katzenbach, Justice Hugo Black—the only dissenter 
regarding Section 5’s constitutionality—made a similar point, asserting 
preclearance was a “radical degradation of state power” which “so distorts our 
constitutional structure of government as to render any distinction drawn in the 
Constitution between state and federal power almost meaningless.”277  
However, Black stood alone in contending Section 5 treated states as “little 
more than conquered provinces,” as the remaining eight Justices found it 
constitutional.278  Furthermore, the basic preclearance requirement has been 
upheld by the Court on three additional occasions,279 most recently in 1999 in 
Lopez v. Monterey County, where six members of the NAMUDNO Court 
rejected the covered jurisdiction’s claim preclearance “would tread on rights 
constitutionally reserved to the States.”280  Lopez explained “the Voting Rights 
Act, by its nature, intrudes on state sovereignty.  The Fifteenth Amendment 
permits this intrusion, however, and our holding today adds nothing of 
constitutional moment to the burdens that the Act imposes.”281  Thus, it is 
difficult to understand the Court’s decision in NAMUDNO simply as a 
declaration the preclearance requirement itself is an impermissible intrusion on 
state sovereignty. 
Rather, the Court’s concern about Section 5’s renewal appears to lie with 
another issue: the coverage formula is outdated and “fails to account for 
current political conditions.”282  The Court explained “[t]hings have changed in 
the South” since the 1960s and 1970s: 
Some of the conditions that we relied upon in upholding this statutory scheme 
in Katzenbach and City of Rome have unquestionably improved . . . .  Voter 
 
 274. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2511. 
 275. Id. at 2513. 
 276. Id. at 2511. 
 277. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358, 360 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 278. Id. at 360 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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turnout and registration rates [between minorities and whites] now approach 
parity.  Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare.  And 
minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.283 
Indeed, the Court’s opinion in NAMUDNO is replete with references to the 
coverage formula.  Specifically, it criticizes the existing coverage formula for 
“differentiat[ing] between the States” “based on data that is now more than 35 
years old” and declares “[t]he evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer 
be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.”284  Rather, to 
pass constitutional muster, NAMUDNO explains Section 5’s “geographic 
coverage” now must be “sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”285  
In perhaps the most revealing portion of the opinion, the Court suggested a 
constitutional coverage formula would require evidence of recent 
discrimination within many, if not most, covered areas: “[T]he Act imposes 
current burdens and must be justified by current needs.”286 
Ultimately, NAMUDNO issued a clear invitation to Congress to address 
Section 5’s coverage or risk it would be held unconstitutional the next time the 
issue came before the Court.  The opinion explained the Court was “keenly 
mindful of [its] institutional role” and “[t]he Fifteenth Amendment empowers 
‘Congress,’ not the Court, to determine in the first instance what legislation is 
needed to enforce it.”287  But if Congress failed to address the perceived 
problem, the Court would do so—it stated it would “not shrink from its duty 
‘as the bulwar[k] of a limited constitution against legislative 
encroachments.”288 
The remaining member of the Court, Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing 
Section 5 should be held unconstitutional immediately.  He explained 
NAMUDNO did not seek “bailout eligibility”—rather, it sought “bailout 
itself.”289  But since “the Court is not in a position to award bailout,” he argued 
“adjudication of the constitutionality of § 5, in my view, cannot be avoided.”290  
And Justice Thomas made it clear he believed Section 5 would fail this test.  In 
 
 283. Id. at 2511; see also id. at 2516 (“More than 40 years ago, this Court concluded that 
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 284. Id. at 2512. 
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his opinion—which was several pages longer than the majority’s—he 
contended “the lack of current evidence of intentional discrimination with 
respect to voting renders § 5 unconstitutional.”291  Indeed, Justice Thomas 
would set the standard of proof for a renewed Section 5 so high Congress 
could not possibly hope to satisfy it.  In his opinion, Justice Thomas stated 
before the Act, there had been a recent history of widespread 
disenfranchisement, fraud, and violence against minority voters in the South, 
and “[i]t was against this backdrop of ‘historical experience’ that § 5 was first 
enacted and upheld against constitutional challenge.”292  Absent these 
“exceptional circumstances,” however, Justice Thomas contended Section 5 
“would not have been [an] appropriate . . . exercise of congressional power.”293  
In other words, he claimed, “the constitutionality of § 5 has always depended 
on the proven existence of intentional discrimination so extensive that 
elimination of it through case-by-case enforcement would be impossible.”294  
Not surprisingly, then, Justice Thomas concluded the “extensive pattern of 
discrimination that led the Court to previously uphold § 5 . . . no longer 
exists.”295 
After Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion was released, voting rights scholars 
expressed surprise at the statutory construction basis for the decision.296  Some 
have asserted the NAMUDNO decision is a textbook example of “judicial 
minimalism” that was “careful to preserve the existing breadth and 
applicability of [S]ection 5,” even at the expense of “arguably ignoring the 
statutory language to sustain its interpretation.”297  But this is more likely faux 
restraint, as a truly minimalist decision could have started and ended with the 
Court’s construction of bailout eligibility and not continued on to discuss the 
Court’s concerns about Section 5’s constitutionality.  In some ways, the 
majority’s opinion is a lurking “time bomb” in the event Congress does not 
narrow Section 5’s scope—if Congress fails to act, a subsequent decision 
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striking down Section 5 could rely heavily on the reasoning articulated in 
NAMUDNO.298 
Indeed, the clock may already be ticking, as several post-NAMUDNO 
challenges to its constitutionality have already landed in court.  The first, 
Laroque v. Holder, was filed in April 2010 by several private citizens of 
Kinston, North Carolina.299  Kinston, a political subdivision of Lenoir County, 
North Carolina,300 received an objection from the Justice Department in 
August 2009 for its switch in a 2008 referendum to nonpartisan elections for 
Kinston’s mayor and city council.301  In its objection, the Justice Department 
stated black voters—who comprise a majority of registered voters in Kinston, 
but have been a minority of the electorate in most general municipal 
elections—depended on “crossover” votes from a small group of white 
Democrats in order to elect a candidate of their choice.302  “[E]limination of 
party affiliation on the ballot,” the Justice Department explained, would likely 
cause black candidates to “lose a significant amount of crossover votes due to 
the high degree of racial polarization present in city elections” and thus would 
“eliminate the single factor that allows black candidates to be elected to 
office.”303  This objection—unlike NAMUDNO—makes the City of Kinston 
ineligible to pursue bailout under the current standard.304  However, the 
plaintiffs in Laroque—individual voters, potential candidates, and an 
unincorporated association of supporters of the referendum for nonpartisan 
elections—face a significant standing challenge before the alleged merits of 
their claim can be heard.  In June 2010, the Justice Department moved to 
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dismiss the Laroque suit, arguing the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing for 
their facial and as-applied challenges to Section 5’s constitutionality.305  This 
motion was granted by the district court in December 2010306 and has been 
appealed to the D.C. Circuit, where the matter is pending as of early March 
2011.307 
A second challenge, Shelby County v. Holder, was filed by Shelby County, 
Alabama, in April 2010.308  Shelby County has requested a declaratory 
judgment that Section 5’s preclearance obligation and Section 4(b)’s coverage 
formula are both unconstitutional exercises of Congress’s powers under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.309  Unlike the private plaintiffs in 
Laroque, however, Shelby County was filed by a “political subdivision” 
directly covered by Section 5 and thus there is no apparent standing challenge 
to its claims.310  Shelby County further asserts it is ineligible for bailout for 
several reasons, including its failure to seek preclearance before implementing 
a voting change and a 2008 Section 5 objection to a municipality located 
within the county’s borders.311  As a result, it asserts the question of whether 
the reenactment of “Section 5’s preclearance obligation and Section 4(b)’s 
coverage formula were constitutional in light of the legislative record before 
Congress in 2006 must now be resolved.”312  Both Shelby County and the 
Justice Department have filed motions for summary judgment on Section 4(b) 
and Section 5’s constitutionality,313 and as of early March 2011, the parties are 
awaiting a ruling from the District Court. 
Third, in Georgia v. Holder, filed in June 2010, the State of Georgia 
requested a declaratory judgment that its verification process for voter 
registration application data—which triggered an objection from the Justice 
Department in May 2009314—did not violate Section 5.315  As an alternative, if 
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Georgia’s voter verification process was not eligible for preclearance, it sought 
a declaratory judgment that Section 5’s continued application was “an 
unconstitutional imposition on the sovereignty of the State of Georgia” and it 
exceeded Congress’s remedial powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments.316  In particular, Georgia attacked the reauthorization of Section 
5 as a “disproportionate, irrational, and incongruous remedy.”317  However, 
this action was dismissed by mutual agreement in November 2010 after the 
Justice Department granted administrative preclearance to a revised version of 
Georgia’s voter verification process.318 
In addition, only a handful of covered jurisdictions have publicly expressed 
interest in obtaining preclearance after NAMUDNO, even though the decision 
greatly expanded the number of political subdivisions that are potentially 
eligible, contradicting the predictions of some observers immediately after the 
Supreme Court’s opinion.319  These include Merced County—one of four 
counties in California subject to Section 5320—and Sandy Springs, Georgia, a 
suburb of Atlanta.321 
Finally, a brief coda to the NAMUDNO case itself is warranted.  After 
remand to the District Court, the Justice Department consented to 
NAMUDNO’s bailout, finding it satisfied the statutory requirements.322  As 
part of the consent decree, NAMUDNO agreed to dismiss its challenge to the 
constitutionality of Section 5 with prejudice.323  And surprisingly, NAMUDNO 
itself recently ceased to exist—in February 2010, the utility district was 
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abolished and its functions were assumed by the City of Austin.324  Thus, while 
the historic NAMUDNO lawsuit itself ended with a whimper, the “bang” may 
be yet to come.325 
V.  ADOPTING A REVISED BAILOUT SYSTEM 
This article recommends Congress accept the Court’s invitation to 
reexamine and revise Section 5’s scope.  In particular, Congress should 
consider—or in some cases, reconsider—several changes to the Act’s bailout 
regime.  These revisions are intended to more narrowly tailor the scope of 
Section 5 by removing from coverage “good” jurisdictions without a recent 
history of discrimination in voting, while permitting continued coverage of 
“bad” jurisdictions that have run afoul of the Act.326 
In sum, this article proposes addressing the Court’s concern that the 
geographic scope of Section 5 is no longer “sufficiently related” to the problem 
of discrimination in voting by modifying bailout to encourage—and even 
require—jurisdictions without a recent history of discrimination be removed 
from coverage.327  Bailout under Section 4(a) and coverage under Section 4(b) 
are essentially “two sides of the same coin”: after achieving bailout, a 
jurisdiction is no longer covered under the Act.328  Thus, the expansion of 
bailout can help correct the problem of overbroad coverage identified in 
NAMUDNO.329 
A. Automatic Bailout 
First, Congress should withdraw from coverage all jurisdictions that have 
not violated any provision of the Act since its last renewal in 1982.  This 
provision, which this article calls “automatic” bailout, would remove from 
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coverage those jurisdictions least likely to discriminate against minority voting 
rights in the future: ones that have consistently complied with Act.  
Specifically, under automatic bailout, a covered jurisdiction would be removed 
from coverage if, since January 1, 1982, it: (1) has not received any Section 5 
objections from the Justice Department or been denied preclearance in the 
district court330 and (2) has not received any adverse final court judgment, 
consent decree, or other settlement of litigation of vote discrimination claims 
under Sections 2 or 203 of the Act. 
There are several benefits to an automatic bailout provision.  First, it would 
obviate many of the reasons why jurisdictions currently eligible for bailout 
have not pursued it on their own—for example, because they are unaware of it, 
because they believe the requirements are too burdensome, or because they 
believe it would cost too much.331  Second, automatic bailout would be 
administratively straightforward to implement because it rests on “objective 
criteria”332—the absence of voting rights violations in both judicial (Section 2) 
and administrative (Section 5) forums.333  In fact, automatic bailout could be 
similar to the process for designating coverage under Section 4: the Voting 
Section of the Justice Department could determine which covered jurisdictions 
satisfy these requirements and publish a list of them in the Federal Register, 
thus removing them from coverage.334 
Third, and most importantly, automatic bailout would help satisfy the 
Court’s requirement in NAMUDNO that Section 5 coverage “must be justified 
by current needs” and targeted at “[t]he evil that § 5 is meant to address,” 
because all remaining covered jurisdictions would have had at least one 
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violation of the Act since the 1982 renewal.335  As Richard Hasen testified 
during the Senate reauthorization hearings in 2006, an expansion of bailout 
would 
help the constitutional case [for Section 5 by] showing that the law is going to 
then be focused on places that continue to have a history of discrimination. . . . 
[B]ailout [can] winnow out those places that have made significant progress on 
the basis of race, and so that those places that are doing well will not have to 
go through the kind of preclearance for these minor types of changes.336 
However, there are also a few potential drawbacks to this automatic bailout 
proposal.  First, it is possible that “bad” jurisdictions could qualify for bailout 
because they have been successfully restrained by the Act, but would resume 
discriminating if Section 5 coverage is dropped.337  This concern, however, 
could be addressed by reinstating coverage if a bailed-out jurisdiction 
subsequently violates Section 2 (or another provision of the Act) for a fixed 
period after automatic bailout.  Indeed, the current bailout provision contains a 
similar requirement, allowing the Justice Department or “any aggrieved 
person” to request re-coverage anytime within a ten-year period after bailout if 
the previously-covered jurisdiction engages in conduct that, had it occurred 
before the date of bailout, would have made it ineligible to achieve bailout.338 
Second, automatic bailout could release from coverage jurisdictions that 
violated minority voting rights, but have failed to come to the Justice 
Department’s attention because they routinely failed to submit election 
changes for preclearance.  For example, two counties in South Dakota that 
contained large Indian reservations were first covered under the 1975 renewal, 
but at the advice of the state’s attorney general, they submitted for preclearance 
less than 10 out of over 600 changes from 1976 to 2002 that had an effect on 
elections or voting.339  However, after 45 years of coverage, there are likely 
few jurisdictions that still routinely attempt to evade their preclearance 
obligations. 
Finally, identifying all jurisdictions eligible for automatic bailout from the 
thousands of local political subdivisions eligible after NAMUDNO340 could be 
 
 335. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2512. 
 336. Hearing on Expiring Provisions, supra note 207, at 19–20 (testimony of Prof. Richard 
Hasen). 
 337. Persily, supra note 239, at 729. 
 338. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(5) (2006). 
 339. Laughlin McDonald, Janine Pease & Richard Guest, Voting Rights in South Dakota:  
1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 195, 195–97 (2007). 
 340. One issue that would need to be resolved for “automatic” bailout is the “nesting” issue—
namely, whether a state or political subdivision can qualify for bailout if a local jurisdiction 
within its borders itself cannot bailout due to previous violations of the Act.  Under NAMUDNO’s 
holding that bailout and preclearance are now based on the “principle of symmetry,” the answer 
would appear to be “yes.”  Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2516. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 57 
a time-consuming endeavor for the Voting Section of the Justice 
Department.341  However, this burden might be ameliorated by shifting part or 
all of the responsibility for identifying eligible jurisdictions to another division 
within the Justice Department or a separate agency. 
This article’s automatic bailout proposal would likely have a dramatic 
effect on the scope of Section 5’s coverage in some states, but in others—
particularly those with the most pervasive record of discrimination—
significant portions would remain covered.  As a case study, this article 
examines the impact of the proposed automatic bailout on Section 5 coverage 
in two states: Virginia and Mississippi. 
1. Case Study #1: Virginia 
Currently, the Commonwealth of Virginia is covered under Section 5, as 
well as most of its major political subdivisions that register voters (counties 
and independent cities).  The exceptions are thirteen counties and four 
independent cities—most of which are located in the Appalachian Mountains 
in the northwestern part of the state, and nearly all of which have low minority 
populations—that have bailed out from coverage since 1997.342  Current 
Section 5 coverage at the county/independent city level in Virginia is 
illustrated in Figure 1a; covered jurisdictions are shaded, while bailed out 
jurisdictions are white. 
  
 
 341. See Rick Hasen, House Moves to Renew Voting Rights Act, ELECTION LAW BLOG, July 
13, 2007, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/006205.html (restating argument by Leadership 
Conference on Civil Rights that requiring Justice Department to determine which covered 
jurisdictions were eligible for bailout would take “considerable resources” and compel it “to 
spend nearly all of its time conducting investigations to determine where discrimination no longer 
exists.”). 
 342. See Amici Brief of Bailed Out Jurisdictions, supra note 121, at Ex. B.  The main 
exception is Essex County, which has an approximately 40% black population, according to the 
2000 census.  U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights–Essex County, 
Va., http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en (input Essex County, Virginia in 
the query box) (last visited Dec. 20, 2010). 
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FIGURE 1a: 
CURRENT SECTION 5 COVERAGE IN VIRGINIA, AT COUNTY/CITY LEVEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If automatic bailout is adopted, a large number of Virginia’s counties and 
independent cities will be removed from Section 5 coverage.  A list of the 
covered jurisdictions after automatic bailout is included in Appendix A.  
Notably, however, several major urban areas with sizeable minority 
populations—such as Chesapeake, Norfolk, Newport News, Richmond and 
neighboring Henrico County, and Petersburg—will still remain covered as a 
result of Section 5 objections and/or Section 2 litigation since January 1, 1982.  
Covered jurisdictions at the county/city level in Virginia after automatic 
bailout are depicted in Figure 1b as shaded areas, while bailed-out jurisdictions 
are depicted in white. 
FIGURE 1b: 
SECTION 5 COVERAGE IN VIRGINIA AFTER AUTOMATIC BAILOUT, AT 
COUNTY/CITY LEVEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, the state itself would remain covered due to Section 5 objections in 
1982 (house legislative reapportionment), 1984 (candidate assistance to 
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voters), and 1991 (house legislative reapportionment), requiring it to continue 
submitting statewide voting changes, such as legislative and Congressional 
redistricting plans, for preclearance.343 
2. Case Study #2: Mississippi 
Like Virginia, the state of Mississippi is presently covered under Section 5.  
No political subdivisions from Mississippi have yet achieved bailout.  This is 
likely due in part to the state’s lengthy record of noncompliance with the Act; 
from 1969 through 2008, 169 separate objections were interposed by the 
Justice Department against election changes enacted by Mississippi and 
jurisdictions within its borders, as compared to thirty-three objections in 
Virginia,344 even though Virginia’s population is over two-and-a-half times 
larger than Mississippi’s.345 
Figure 2 demonstrates the impact of this article’s automatic bailout 
proposal on Mississippi at the county level.  After automatic bailout, a majority 
of Mississippi’s counties (forty-seven) would remain covered under Section 5, 
while thirty-three would be bailed out.  The remaining covered jurisdictions 
would include Hinds County, the largest county by population (almost nine 
percent of the state) and home to Jackson, the state’s capitol.  Also covered 
would be the counties containing Mississippi’s next three largest cities, 
Gulfport (Harrison County), Hattiesburg (Forest County), and Biloxi (Harrison 
County).  Furthermore, many covered jurisdictions are “repeat offenders” of 
the Act.  For example, Bolivar and Sunflower Counties, located adjacent to 
each other in the northwestern part of the state, have received five and six 
separate objections, respectively, since 1982.346  A complete list of 
jurisdictions that would remain covered in Mississippi after automatic bailout 
is listed in Appendix B. 
  
 
 343. Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Gerald Baliles, Va. Att’y Gen. (Mar. 12, 1982); Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Bridge, Va. Assistant Att’y Gen. (Aug. 3, 1984); 
Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to K. Marshall Cook, Va. 
Deputy Att’y Gen. (July 16, 1991), referenced at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/va_ 
obj2.php. 
 344. Compare Voting Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., Section 5 Objection 
Determinations – Mississippi, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ms_obj2.php (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2010) (listing 169 objection letters), with Voting Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
Civil Rights Div., Section 5 Objection Determinations – Virginia, http://www.justice.gov/crt/ 
about/vot/sec_5/va_obj2.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2010) (listing 33 objection letters). 
 345. U.S. Census Bureau, State Rankings–Statistical Abstract of the United States:  Resident 
Population–July 2009, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/ranks/rank01.html (last 
updated Dec. 22, 2009). 
 346. This figure does not count separate objections to towns or other municipalities within 
these counties. 
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FIGURE 2: 
SECTION 5 COVERAGE IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER AUTOMATIC BAILOUT, AT 
COUNTY LEVEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Like Virginia, the state of Mississippi itself would be covered due to 
multiple Section 5 objections since 1982.  Specifically, Mississippi received 
Section 5 objections in 1982 (reapportionment of Congressional districts), 
1983 (primary and general election dates), 1989 (modification of school 
district boundaries after city annexations), 1991 (redistricting of state house 
and senate legislative districts), 1992 (mail-in voter registration requirements), 
1993 (use of single-member districts for school boards), 1995 (prohibition on 
elected officials holding multiple offices), 1997 (implementation of the 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993), and 2010 (majority vote requirement 
for election to certain county boards of education and boards of trustees for 
municipal school districts),347 as well as adverse Section 2 judgments in 1984 
and 1991.348 
 
 347. See Voting Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., Section 5 Objection 
Determinations – Mississippi, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ms_obj2.php (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2010). 
 348. Jordan v. Winter, 604 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Miss. 1984), aff’d sub nom. Miss. Republican 
Exec. Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984); Miss. St. Chapter, Operation Push, Inc. v. Mabus, 
932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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B. Optional Bailout and Related Proposals 
In addition, Congress should also revise the existing statutory requirements 
for covered jurisdictions to voluntarily request bailout, which this article calls 
“optional” bailout.  Any revision to the current standard for bailout in Section 
4(a) should further its objective to “provide incentives to jurisdictions” with a 
history of discrimination in voting “to attain compliance with the law and 
increas[e] participation by minority citizens in the political process of their 
community.”349  Thus, the main objective of the revisions to optional bailout 
proposed by this article is to simplify the requirements for a covered 
jurisdiction to establish it has adequately cured its past discrimination and 
should be released from coverage. 
To achieve optional bailout, a covered jurisdiction should be required to 
satisfy a two-part test.  First, like the existing bailout standard, the jurisdiction 
should be required to satisfy an “objective” requirement that it has not violated 
the Act.  For this requirement, a jurisdiction would have to establish, for the 
past twenty years: (1) it has not received any Section 5 objection from the 
Justice Department or denial of preclearance by the District Court, and (2) it 
has not received an adverse final court judgment or entered into a consent 
decree in litigation under Sections 2 or 203 of the Act.350  Unlike the pre-
NAMUDNO standard, however, jurisdictions would not be required to 
demonstrate all governmental units located within the jurisdiction’s territory 
 
 349. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 43 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 222. 
 350. This Article proposes a twenty (20) year, rather than the existing ten (10) year, 
compliance period for optional bailout because the relatively small number of Section 5 
objections interposed during the 2000s would mean that the vast majority of covered 
jurisdictions—even after automatic bailout—would satisfy this requirement.  For example, in 
Mississippi, the Justice Department’s website indicates that only a single objection—to the town 
of Kilmichael, population 830—was made in the entire state from 2000 through 2009.  See 
Voting Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., Section 5 Objection Determinations – 
Mississippi, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ms_obj2.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2010).  
One additional objection, to the State of Mississippi, was also made in March 2010.  See Letter 
from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Margaret L. Meeks, Special 
Assistant Att’y Gen., State of Mississippi (Mar. 24, 2010), http://justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ 
pdfs/l_032410.pdf.  In fact, the Justice Department made only 55 objections from January 2000 
through July 2008 for all covered jurisdictions.  Voting Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil 
Rights Div., Section 5 Objection Determinations, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/obj_ 
activ.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2010).  As previously explained, the low number of objections 
during the 2000s may be due to two reasons:  the Supreme Court’s decision in Reno v. Bossier 
Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (“Bossier II”), which dramatically reduced the scope 
of the “purpose” prong of Section 5, and possible under-enforcement of Section 5 by political 
appointees in the Justice Department during the Bush Administration.  See supra note 164.  For 
these reasons, a rolling twenty-year period for compliance seems more appropriate. 
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had also satisfied these requirements.351  As a result, a covered State that met 
these requirements could bail out, even if one or more of its counties had 
received a Section 5 objection or had an adverse court decision in Section 2 
litigation.352  In other words, this requirement would mirror automatic bailout, 
except it would cover a rolling twenty-year period, rather than being fixed at a 
certain date (1982). 
Second, to achieve optional bailout, the existing “subjective” criteria353 
that require a jurisdiction to demonstrate it has taken sufficient steps to expand 
minority participation in the electoral process354 would be replaced by a more 
quantitative measure: whether minority citizens in the covered jurisdiction 
have participated in the electoral process at rates substantially similar to non-
Hispanic white voters in the last two federal elections.  This would not require 
that minority citizens vote at identical (or greater) rates than non-Hispanic 
whites, but rather at comparable levels with some minor variation—perhaps 
5%—for reasons unrelated to past or present discrimination, such as voter 
enthusiasm for particular candidate(s) or depressed turnout due to 
uncompetitive races or unopposed candidates. 
In several states, this requirement already is satisfied (or is close to being 
satisfied) for black voters, but significant improvement would be needed in 
turnout among Hispanic voters in most covered jurisdictions.  For example, 
based on Census Bureau data from the 2006 congressional midterm election, 
blacks in the states of Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina voted at rates 
within the proposed 5% test compared to non-Hispanic whites (and in the latter 
two states, black voters actually voted at a higher rate), with Georgia and 
Louisiana not far behind at 6.2% and 5.6% respectively.355  However, all of the 
covered states with a substantial Hispanic population—Arizona, Georgia, 
Texas, and Virginia—would need to make significant progress in Hispanic 
 
 351. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(D) (2006) (providing that to obtain preclearance, a State or 
political subdivision must demonstrate that “all governmental units within its territory have 
complied with section [5]”).  If a covered jurisdiction achieves bailout, however, any smaller 
governmental units within the jurisdiction’s territory that were also subject to Section 5 would 
remain covered, unless such unit(s) were separately eligible for and requested optional bailout as 
well.  Id. at § 1973b(a)(1). 
 352. In addition, unlike the current standard, the covered jurisdiction would not have to 
demonstrate that it had not been assigned any federal examiners.  See id. § 1973b(a)(1)(C). 
 353. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2904, 2518 (2009) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
 354. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(F)(i)–(iii) (2006); see also supra text accompanying notes 103–
104. 
 355. U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2006, tbl. 4b 
(2008), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2006/tables.html. 
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voter participation to be eligible for bailout, as the gap in turnout compared to 
non-Hispanic whites ranged between 14.7% (Arizona) and 25.9% (Georgia).356 
TABLE 1: TURNOUT DATA IN 2006 ELECTION, AS % OF ELIGIBLE 
POPULATION357 
Covered State Non-Hispanic 
Whites 
Blacks Hispanics 
Alabama 50.9% 47.8% Not available 
Alaska 58.1% Not available Not available 
Arizona 51.1% 24.4% 36.4% 
Georgia 46.9% 40.7% 21.0% 
Louisiana 41.9% 36.3% Not available 
Mississippi 39.9% 50.5% Not available 
South Carolina 43.7% 50.6% Not available 
Texas 45.2% 36.7% 25.4% 
Virginia 51.9% 35.9% 31.9% 
 
A similar pattern exists for the 2008 presidential election, where both black 
and Hispanic voters participated at record levels.  Black turnout exceeded that 
of non-Hispanic whites in four states, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina and 
Texas, and was the same in Alabama.358  In Virginia, black turnout was only 
marginally lower than non-Hispanic whites (1.1%), while there was a larger 
difference in both Louisiana (6.2%) and Arizona (14.6%).359  Again, however, 
the proportion of Hispanic citizens voting in 2008 substantially lagged behind 
non-Hispanic whites, although progress was made in both Georgia (9.6% 
difference in 2008 vs. 25.9% in 2006) and Virginia (12.9% difference in 2008 
vs. 20% in 2006).360 
 
 356. This difference is apparently not unique to covered jurisdictions; nationally, 32.3% of 
Hispanic citizens voted in 2006, compared to 51.6% of white non-Hispanics—a difference of 
19.3%.  Id. at tbl. 3.  The lower participation rates for Hispanics appears partially due to 
differences in registration rates; 71.2% of non-Hispanic white citizens were registered in 2006, 
compared to only 53.7% of Hispanic citizens.  Id. 
 357. Id. at tbl. 4b.  “Not available” indicates the base was less than 75,000 persons and 
therefore too small for the Census Bureau to include the derived measure in its report. 
 358. U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008, tbl. 4b 
(2009), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2008/tables.html. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. 
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TABLE 2: TURNOUT DATA IN 2008 ELECTION, AS % OF ELIGIBLE 
POPULATION361 
Covered State Non-Hispanic 
Whites 
Blacks Hispanics 
Alabama 62.5% 62.5% Not available 
Alaska 71.2% Not available Not available 
Arizona 67.0% 52.4% 36.6% 
Georgia 64.1% 67.9% 54.5% 
Louisiana 72.4% 66.2% Not available 
Mississippi 68.4% 72.9% Not available 
South Carolina 63.5% 72.6% Not available 
Texas 64.7% 64.9% 37.8% 
Virginia 69.4% 68.3% 56.5% 
 
In addition, Congress should consider two other measures related to 
optional bailout.  First, it should implement Professor Hasen’s “proactive 
bailout” proposal.  During Senate hearings, Hasen proposed the Justice 
Department be required to proactively identify jurisdictions that satisfy the 
bailout criteria and inform them the Attorney General would consent to bailout 
if they requested it.362  Placing the burden on the Justice Department to identify 
eligible jurisdictions and facilitate their bailout “would help the constitutional 
case [by] showing that the law is going to . . . be focused on places that have a 
history of discrimination” and thus “winnow out those places that have made 
significant progress.”363  The Justice Department could be required to conduct 
this review on a biannual basis, after each federal election, to determine if any 
additional jurisdictions are eligible to seek removal from coverage. 
Finally, Congress should permit covered jurisdictions that succeed in a 
bailout suit over the Justice Department’s opposition to recover reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs.364  As previously explained, there is likely a 
 
 361. Id.  “Not available” indicates the base was less than 75,000 persons and therefore too 
small for the Census Bureau to include the derived measure. 
 362. Hearing on Expiring Provisions, supra note 207, at 19–20; see also McDonald, supra 
note 43, at 269 (arguing if the existing bailout provision is ineffective, “a solution would be for 
the Department of Justice to proactively notify jurisdictions that they are potentially eligible for 
bailout, explain bailout procedures, and assist jurisdictions with initiating bailout litigation.”). 
 363. Hearing on Expiring Provisions, supra note 207, at 20; see also id. at 37 (“My proposal 
for easing the bailout would put the onus on the Justice Department to review each covered 
jurisdiction’s history, and to take proactive steps to inform jurisdictions that have met the 
requirements that they may bailout.”). 
 364. This Article, however, does not advocate permitting jurisdictions to recover attorney’s 
fees in all successful bailout litigation.  Rather, it would restrict it to only litigation where the 
Justice Department opposes bailout.  If recovery of attorney’s fees was extended to all bailout 
suits, it could impose a considerable expense on the federal government, particularly if it resulted 
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perception among covered jurisdictions that bailout is too expensive to pursue, 
especially in light of the relatively low financial burden imposed by 
preclearance.365  Federal courts traditionally refrain from awarding attorney’s 
fees to prevailing litigants absent a specific statutory authorization.366  
However, Congress has frequently adopted “specific and explicit provisions 
for the allowance of attorney’s fees under selected statutes granting or 
protecting various federal rights.”367  For example, attorney’s fees may be 
awarded to a prevailing party in litigation under Section 2 of the Act, except 
for the federal government.368 
Permitting jurisdictions that successfully prevail in a bailout suit over the 
Justice Department’s opposition to recover reasonable attorney’s fees would 
serve two purposes.  First, it would create a financial incentive for covered 
jurisdictions to pursue bailout if they reasonably believe they are entitled to 
termination of coverage, but the Justice Department has declined to consent to 
relief.  Ordinarily, given the high costs of litigation, the Justice Department’s 
opposition would sound the death knell for a bailout request, even in a close 
case.  But if a jurisdiction has the opportunity to obtain bailout almost cost-free 
through a recovery of attorney’s fees, this might incentivize it to pursue the 
bailout claim.  In addition, an award of attorney’s fees would encourage the 
Justice Department to promptly determine whether the bailout request was 
meritorious and oppose the requested relief only in cases where the covered 
jurisdiction was clearly not entitled to it.369 
CONCLUSION 
During the 2006 reauthorization, Congress was unable to revise Section 5’s 
coverage formula or amend its bailout requirements to more narrowly tailor it 
 
in dozens or hundreds of newly-eligible jurisdictions after NAMUDNO seeking bailout.  In 
addition, the Justice Department might end up paying attorney’s fees in cases where it would 
have consented to bailout anyway, resulting in a “windfall” for covered jurisdictions.  A more 
targeted attorney’s fees provision limited to cases where the Justice Department improperly 
opposed bailout thus would likely be more effective. 
 365. See supra Part II. 
 366. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 253–60 (1975); 
see also Mark D. Boveri, Note, Surveying the Law of Fee Awards Under the Attorney’s Fees 
Awards Act, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1293 (1984). 
 367. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 260–61. 
 368. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) (2006) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce the voting 
guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, the court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”). 
 369. See, e.g., Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 201, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“By 
awarding attorneys’ fees, the courts make both delay and litigation less likely, thereby 
encouraging earlier resolution of claims.”).  Cf. Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal 
Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct 
(Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217 (1994). 
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to apply to jurisdictions with a recent history of discrimination in voting.  After 
NAMUDNO, it now has a second chance to do so.  This article proposes 
several changes to accomplish this objective.  First, Congress should 
automatically remove from coverage all jurisdictions that have not been found 
to violate the Act since 1982 by either a Section 5 objection or in litigation 
under Sections 2 and 203.  Second, Congress should adopt a streamlined 
bailout test for the remaining covered jurisdictions by focusing on two things: 
the jurisdiction’s compliance with the Act over the previous twenty years and 
whether minority voters in the jurisdiction participate in the election process at 
rates substantially similar to non-Hispanic whites.  The Justice Department 
should help identify jurisdictions that are bailout-eligible and facilitate their 
removal from coverage by consenting to bailout.  Finally, if the Justice 
Department opposes a bailout suit that is later successful, the covered 
jurisdiction should be entitled to recover attorney’s fees.  Failure to take these 
steps, or similar ones that effectively tailor the scope of the preclearance 
requirement, will likely result in an uncertain future for Section 5. 
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APPENDIX A 
SECTION 5 COVERAGE IN VIRGINIA AFTER AUTOMATIC BAILOUT 
Jurisdiction Basis for Coverage Preclearance 
Submission No./ 
Court Decision
  Date 
Petersburg City Section 5 Objection No. 81-2199 3/1/1982 
State Section 5 Objection No. 82-2748 3/12/1982 
Southampton 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 81-2235 6/21/1982 
Greensville 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 82-2786 11/15/1982 
State Section 5 Objection No. 84-3793 8/3/1984 
Franklin City Section 5 Objection No. 84-4549 3/11/1986 
Richmond 
County 
Section 2 Judgment Henderson v. Bd. 
of Supervisors of 
Richmond Cnty., 
988 WL 86680 
(E.D. Va.) 
6/6/1988 
Nottoway 
County 
Section 2 Judgment Neal v. Cleburn, 
689 F. Supp. 1426 
(E.D. Va.) 
6/27/1988 
Henrico County Section 2 Judgment McDaniels v. 
Mehford, 702 F. 
Supp. 588 (E.D. 
Va.) 
12/30/1988 
Newport News Section 5 Objection No. 88-5098 7/24/1989 
Norfolk City Section 2 Judgment Collins v. City of 
Norfolk, 883 F.2d 
1232 (4th Cir.) 
8/18/1989 
State Section 5 Objection No. 91-1483 7/16/1991 
Powhatan 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 91-2115 11/12/1991 
Newport News 
City 
School District 
Section 5 Objection No. 92-3887 2/16/1993 
Chesapeake 
City School 
District 
Section 5 Objection No. 93-4561 6/20/1994 
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Dinwiddie 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 99-2229 10/27/1999 
Northampton 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 2001-1495 9/28/2001 
Pittsylvania 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 2001-2026 
No. 2001-2501 
4/29/2002 
Cumberland 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 2001-2374 7/29/2002 
Northampton 
County 
Section 5 Objection No.  2002-5693 5/19/2003 
Northampton 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 2003-3010 10/21/2003 
Data Sources: 
 Voting Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., Section 5 Objection 
Determinations – Virginia, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/va_ 
obj2.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2010). 
 Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings 
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 643, tbls. A, C, D (2006); see also http://www.votingreport.org. 
 Westlaw database, U.S. District Courts – Virginia (DCTVA). 
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APPENDIX B 
SECTION 5 COVERAGE IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER AUTOMATIC BAILOUT 
Jurisdiction Basis for 
Coverage 
Preclearance 
Submission No./ 
Court Decision 
Date 
State Section 5 Objection No. 81-1697 3/30/1982 
Lucedale 
(George 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 82-2252 7/27/1982 
State Section 5 Objection No. 82-2250 2/22/1983 
Copiah County Section 5 Objection No. 82-2240 4/11/1983 
Adams County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2228 5/23/1983 
Covington 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 83-2383 5/23/1984 
Quitman 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 83-2515 5/27/1983 
Scott County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2519 5/31/1986 
Amite County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2335 6/6/1983 
Warren County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2544 6/10/1983 
Bolivar County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2346 6/13/1983 
Oktibbeha 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 83-2498 6/17/1983 
Winston County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2556 6/29/1983 
Jones County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2450 7/1/1983 
Lincoln County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2472 7/5/1983 
Lauderdale 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 83-2457 7/5/1983 
Tallahatchie 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 82-2317 7/11/1983 
Adams County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2328 7/11/1983 
Copiah County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2376 7/18/1983 
Sunflower 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 83-2529 7/19/1984 
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Ridgeland 
Municipal 
School District 
(Madison 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 83-2481 7/25/1983 
Bolivar County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2357 8/9/1983 
Tate County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2536 8/1/51983 
Leflore County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2468 8/22/1983 
Pike County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2508 
No. 83-2510 
8/26/1983 
Leflore County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2470 9/6/1983 
Yazoo County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2560 12/16/1983 
Lawrence 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 83-2462 1/3/1984 
Indianola 
(Sunflower 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 83-2533 1/20/1984 
Issquena 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 83-2440 2/10/1984 
Natchez 
(Adams 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 83-2331 2/21/1984 
Collins 
(Covington 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 83-2382 3/23/1984 
Bolivar County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2351 4/16/1984 
State Section 2 Judgment Jordan v. Winter, 
604 F. Supp. 807 
(N.D. Miss.) 
4/16/1984 
Pike County Section 5 Objection No. 83-2511 5/4/1984 
Greenwood 
(Leflore 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 84-2469 5/14/1984 
Greenwood 
(Leflore 
County) 
Section 2 Judgment Jordan v. City of 
Greenwood, 599 F. 
Supp. 397 (N.D. 
Miss.) 
10/25/1984 
 
Tate County Section 5 Objection No. 84-3011 11/26/1984 
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Leflore County Section 5 Objection No. 84-2968 
No. 84-2969 
4/1/1985 
Sunflower 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 84-2007 6/7/1985 
Madison 
County 
Section 2 Judgment Goodloe v. 
Madison Cnty. Bd. 
of Elec. Comm’rs, 
610 F. Supp. 240 
(S.D. Miss.) 
6/25/1985 
Madison 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 85-2859 9/10/1985 
Sunflower 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 85-2904 6/7/1985 
Yazoo County Section 5 Objection No. 84-3024 12/20/1985 
State Section 5 Objection No. 86-3683 7/1/1986 
Yazoo County Section 5 Objection No. 86-3786 7/7/1986 
Sunflower 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 86-3763 12/15/1986 
Houston 
(Chickasaw 
County) 
Section 2 Judgment Wright v. City of 
Houston, 806 F.2d 
634 (5th Cir.) 
12/30/1986 
Pike County 
School District 
Section 5 Objection No. 83-2512 2/9/1987 
Mississippi 
Judicial 
Elections 
Section 2 Judgment Martin v. Allain, 
Kirksey v. Allain, 
658 F. Supp. 1183 
(S.D. Miss) 
4/1/1987 
Grenada County Section 5 Objection No. 87-3101 6/2/1987 
Washington 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 87-3308 6/19/1987 
Quitman 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 87-3225 9/28/1987 
Belzoni 
(Humphreys 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 86-3627 10/1/1987 
Monroe County Section 5 Objection No. 87-3200 1/12/1988 
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Grenada 
Municipal 
School District 
(Grenada 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 87-3098 
No. 87-3099 
5/9/1988 
Chickasaw 
County 
Section 2 Judgment Gunn v. 
Chickasaw Cnty., 
705 F. Supp. 315 
(N.D. Miss.) 
1/24/1989 
Greenville 
(Washington 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 88-4074 2/10/1989 
State Section 5 Objection No. 87-3282 3/31/1989 
Houston 
Municipal 
School District 
(Chickasaw 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 87-3067 4/18/1989 
Chickasaw 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 89-2646 2/27/1990 
State Section 5 Objection No. 88-4035 5/25/1990 
Monroe County Section 2 Judgment Ewing v. Monroe 
Cnty., 740 F. Supp. 
417 (N.D. Miss.) 
6/29/1990 
Cleveland 
Consolidated 
School District 
(Bolivar 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 90-3474 10/2/1990 
Simpson 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 90-3602 
No. 90-3604 
10/5/1990 
Monroe County Section 5 Objection No. 90-3575 4/26/1991 
State Section 2 Judgment Miss. St. Chapter, 
Operation Push, 
Inc. v. Mabus, 932 
F.2d 400 (5th Cir.) 
5/31/1991 
Tate County Section 5 Objection No. 91-1137 7/2/1991 
State Section 5 Objection No. 91-1402 7/2/1991 
Bolivar County Section 5 Objection No. 91-1457 7/15/1991 
Hinds County Section 5 Objection No. 91-1503 7/19/1991 
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Union County Section 5 Objection No. 91-0800 8/2/1991 
Lee County Section 5 Objection No. 91-1096 8/23/1991 
Bolivar County Section 5 Objection No. 91-2939 8/23/1991 
Amite County Section 5 Objection No. 91-1504 8/23/1991 
Tunica County Section 5 Objection No. 91-1438 9/3/1991 
Benton County Section 5 Objection No. 91-1097 9/9/1991 
Harrison 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 91-1401 9/9/1991 
Jefferson Davis 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 91-1559 9/13/1991 
Montgomery 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 91-1139 9/16/1991 
Clarke County Section 5 Objection No. 91-1392 9/24/1991 
Oktibbeha 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 91-1451 9/30/1991 
Walthall County Section 5 Objection No. 91-1421 9/30/1991 
Marshall 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 91-1375 9/30/1991 
Lauderdale 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 91-2342 10/7/1991 
Forrest County Section 5 Objection No. 91-1506 10/7/1991 
Tate County Section 5 Objection No. 91-2967 10/11/1991 
Leflore County Section 5 Objection No. 91-1463 10/21/1991 
Sunflower 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 91-1629 10/25/1991 
Perry County Section 5 Objection No. 91-1598 11/19/1991 
Pearl River 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 91-1579 11/25/1991 
Attala County Section 5 Objection No. 91-2449 1/13/1992 
State Section 5 Objection No. 92-0993 3/30/1992 
Tallahatchie 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 91-3011 4/27/1992 
State Section 5 Objection No. 91-3975 5/1/1992 
Sunflower 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 92-1415 5/21/1992 
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Marshall 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 92-3602 10/31/1992 
Amite County Section 5 Objection No. 92-2548 11/30/1992 
Greenville 
(Washington 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 92-4012 2/22/1993 
Lawrence 
County 
Section 2 Judgment Bryant v. 
Lawrence Cnty., 
814 F. Supp. 1346 
(S.D. Miss.) 
3/3/1993 
Lee County Section 5 Objection No. 93-1026 3/22/1993 
Chickasaw 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 92-4440 3/26/1993 
Gloster (Amite 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 92-4396 3/30/1993 
Charleston 
(Tallahatchie 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 93-1053 6/4/1993 
Monroe County Section 5 Objection No. 93-0356 9/17/1993 
Okolona 
(Chickasaw 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 93-1558 10/29/1993 
State Section 5 Objection No. 90-4933 11/24/1993 
Canton 
(Madison 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 93-0115 12/21/1993 
Clarke County Section 5 Objection No. 93-4338 1/10/1994 
Carroll County Section 5 Objection No. 93-2449 4/18/1994 
Quitman 
(Clarke County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 94-2431 12/19/1994 
Adams County Section 5 Objection No. 94-4463 1/30/1995 
State Section 5 Objection No. 94-4538 2/6/1995 
Monroe County Section 5 Objection No. 95-0118 3/20/1995 
Chickasaw 
County 
Section 5 Objection No. 94-4316 4/11/1995 
Union County Section 5 Objection No. 95-1234 6/20/1995 
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Aberdeen 
(Monroe 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 95-1120 12/4/1995 
Attala County Section 2 Judgment Teague v. Attala 
Cnty., 92 F.3d 283 
(5th Cir.) 
8/8/1996 
Calhoun County Section 2 Judgment Clark v. Calhoun 
Cnty., 88 F.3d 
1393 (5th Cir.) 
7/9/1996 
Grenada 
(Grenada 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 96-3225 3/3/1997 
State Section 5 Objection No. 95-0418 9/22/1997 
Chickasaw 
County 
Section 2 Judgment Gunn v. 
Chickasaw Cnty., 
1997 WL 
33426761 (N.D. 
Miss) 
10/28/1997 
 
Quitman 
(Clarke County) 
Section 2 Judgment Citizens for Good 
Gov’t v. City of 
Quitman, 148 F.3d 
472 (5th Cir.)* 
7/24/1998 
Grenada 
(Grenada 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 96-2219 
No. 98-1598 
8/17/1998 
Lafayette 
County 
Section 2 Judgment Houston v. 
Lafayette County, 
20 F. Supp. 2d 996 
(N.D. Miss.) 
8/24/1998 
McComb (Pike 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 97-3795 6/28/1999 
Kilmichael 
(Montgomery 
County) 
Section 5 Objection No. 2001-2130 12/11/2001 
Tupelo Section 2 Judgment Jamison v. Tupelo, 
471 F. Supp. 2d 
706 (N.D. Miss.) 
1/23/2007 
 
* Section 2 violation found by District Court; this finding was not contested on appeal.  Fifth 
Circuit reversed and remanded on District Court’s proposed remedy. 
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Noxubee 
County 
Section 2 Judgment United States v. 
Brown, 494 F. 
Supp. 2d 440 (S.D. 
Miss.) 
6/29/2007 
State Section 5 Objection No. 2009-2022 3/24/2010 
Data Sources: 
 Voting Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., Section 5 Objection 
Determinations – Mississippi, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ 
ms_obj2.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2010). 
 Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings 
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 643, tbls. A, C, D (2006); see also http://www.votingreport.org. 
 Westlaw database, U.S. District Courts – Mississippi (DCTMS). 
 
